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ABSTRACT
This investigation focuses on two competing theories (historical institutionalism and

social constructivism) and their explanatory value in regards to female political
representation in Kazakhstan. Historical Institutionalism maintains that current
institutional dynamics are constrained by past institutional formations, even when these
past institutions are no longer relevant. Social Constructivism challenges this theory by
upholding that institutions are culturally situated and a reflection of shared ideas rather
than material forces as argued by historical institutionalism.
Based on Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) four dimensions of representation (formal, descriptive,
substantive, and symbolic), I examine how Kazakhstan’s Soviet past and its creation of a
Kazakh ethnic-national identity resulted in the decline of female political representation
in all four dimensions. Utilizing official documents, news reports, and interviews
conducted with elite females and university students in Almaty, Kazakhstan, women are
less represented now than they were under the Soviet regime. Although those interviewed
felt they have more freedom under the current regime, realistically women not only have
fewer formal mechanisms to guarantee representation, but also substantively, women’s
issues have been subverted in order to promote a unified Kazakh identity. Where women
were once of symbol of equality under the Soviet regime, in its place stands ethnic
nationalism epitomized in the form of one Kazakh man, President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Comparing these results back to the two theoretical frameworks, historical
institutionalism and social constructivism individually do not adequately provide an
overall assessment on the current status of women in Kazakhstan. By integrating these
two theories under one overarching lens, a more complete analysis on how the
combination of both Kazakhstan’s desire to break from its institutional past and reassert
dominance of a Kazakh national identity triggered the loss of female representation in
Kazakhstan.
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Chapter One:
An Introduction: Gender Politics in Kazakhstan
Introduction
This study focuses on female political representation in Kazakhstan by merging
the frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism under one lens.
Through the utilization of on-the-ground interviews conducted while in Kazakhstan I
argue that these frameworks alone do not adequately depict the current stage of female
representation in Kazakhstan because each framework fails to account for the strengths
found in the other. Historical institutionalism minimizes the role of cultural norms and
construction of identity while social constructivism diminishes the role of path dependent
behavior and critical junctures sending institutional patterns down a different trajectory.
Initially, my research on female political participation in Kazakhstan was to
include interviews with elected female officials, party leadership, female political
candidates, academics, and non-governmental organizations. However, time constraints
due to Visa requirements restricting my time in country to 25 days and the lack of access
to political institutions and key decision makers I was limited to interviewing a small
number of non-governmental organizations, academics and group of university students.
Yet, despite these limitations, two very important preliminary findings emerged: I find
that the current status of female representation is both due to Kazakhstan’s tumultuous
relationship with its Soviet past in regards to historical institutional design and its
changing relationship to the social construction of gender and ethnic identity.
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I chose to study female political representation in Kazakhstan because it offers a
unique case in studying female political participation as compared to not only its Central
Asian neighbors but also other “Stans.” Although a predominantly Muslim country with
over 70 percent of the population identifying as Muslim, religion remains a relatively
non-issue in state institutions compared to other mostly Muslim countries. Even with as a
self-described Muslim, President Nazarbayev, has banned religious symbols from
governmental institutions and has promoted gender equality in his current rhetoric.
Perhaps aligning itself with more of its Soviet past and not a jihadist uprising seen in
neighboring countries, Kazakhstan serves an example of where we would most likely to
expect to see changes or an improvement in female political representation.
Background of the Problem
From 1917 to 1991, religion was seen as the antithesis of political enlightenment
and women’s emancipation throughout the form Soviet Union. Under the Communist
regime, over 6,000 Orthodox churches closed, Islamic regions stretching from Azerbaijan
to Kazakhstan came under state control, and individuals were inundated with
antireligious and scientific propaganda. While religious freedom was violently
suppressed, women were forced into the public sphere and the paid labor force under this
guise of emancipation. Although this process pushed women out of their traditional roles
within the home and into the labor force, never were they really treated as equal. This
both supported and contradicted Marx’s belief that for women, private gender relations
mirrored capitalism and patriarchal oppression based upon private ownership over the
means of production. However, Marxism’s promise for equality among men and women
never bore fruit. Until the Soviet Union’s demise, women faced lower pay, less desirable
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employment, little political voice, and the loss of a feminine identity that they could
claim as their own.
Although Russification policies are often attributed to Stalin, primitive forms of
these policies began under Tsar Alexander II and were instilled to “ensure state control
over a diverse population” (Weeks 2010). One example was the promotion of Russian
Orthodoxy over Catholicism in countries such as Poland and Lithuania. Although
assimilation programs were a rare occurrence, the purpose of the rudimentary codes was
to defuse separatist nationalism (Martin 2010). However, after the Russian Revolution of
1917, this relatively passive approach that had supported non-Russian national cultures in
form but not content took a dramatic shift, specifically in Central Asia. Due to Central
Asia’s Islamic history, the Central Party feared the idea of Pan-Islamism through which
Muslims would identify themselves as a single community. Not only did this idea
threaten the control Russia wanted to maintain, Soviet ideology also saw this and other
religions as a “superstition that stood in the way of progress” (Kort 2004). In order to
prevent the uniting of the Islamic republics of Central Asia, the Soviet CCP leadership
came up with a two-pronged method to instill Russification policies within these
societies. First, they separated Turkestan into five ethnic units (today: Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) but left pockets of each group
within the others’ borders to create internal friction between these groups. Second, in
1927, they changed the official written alphabet from Arabic to Latin and eventually to
Cyrillic in the 1940s. This made previous literature inaccessible and impeded political
national identity formation and continuity in the region (Kort 2004). The Russian
language was used as a non-threatening tool to unite the multi-ethnic “Soviet people”
3

(Matuskiewicz 2010:213). In Kazakhstan, elites held positions within the state, but
control remained within the Central Communist Party and among ethnic Russians. With
ethnic Russians dominating the Republic’s Communist Party and thus the Kazakh Soviet
Socialist Republic, the Kazakh language became all but obsolete in relation to
governmental functions for nearly seven decades: Kazakhs who were unwilling to
assimilate under these policies were seen as uncivilized and alienated from the political
process.
Although Russification had more to do with homogenizing identity, Stalin’s
economic approach to industrialization through collectivization ultimately led to the
conquering of these cultures through starvation tactics. Under policies meant to promote
industrialization, 20 million peasant farms were seized in order to form two hundred
thousand collective farms. The seizing of peasants’ grain and property to feed the cities
and factories led to the “Terror” famine which many have described as forced genocide,
resulting in the starvation of millions. Most notably, Kazakhstan’s nomadic culture of
herding became all but obsolete: under Stalin’s policies, over eighty percent of the
livestock in Kazakhstan were killed or died of starvation over a four year period in the
late 1920s to 1930s (Kort 2004:54). To further maintain his control, he jailed and
murdered supposed opposition during the Great Purge of 1934-1938, eliminating any
remaining opposition these cultures might have raised towards assimilation into the
Soviet culture.
The combined effect of religious oppression and involuntary emancipation had an
adverse outcome for women, especially in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and
other Central Asia Republics. Comprising of 14% of the population, women held
4

traditional Muslim values, greatly contradicting Bolshevik ideology, even though the
Communist party promised them higher living standards and modernization. When these
republics finally gained independence following the collapse of the USSR, a resurgence
of identity politics, emphasizing patriarchal and ethnic norms, once again forced women
to the sidelines.
After the collapse, indigenous elites began institutionalizing Kazakhification
policies (Kolsto 1998, Dave 2007). Kazakhification is the “process of the ascendance of
Kazakhs as a national group at the expense of other national groups, mainly Russians”
(Matuszkiewicz 2010:216). These policies include language and citizenship requirements
which resulted in the mass emigration of the once majority Russian population. Under the
1999 “Law on Languages,” Kazakh formally became the state language in administrative
governmental communications and public life (Peyrouse 2007:485). In order to run for
political office, candidates must now be fluent in Kazakh, and only Kazakh-language
media outlets are eligible for state subsidies. Although Russian is still the predominant
language used by the population, since 2000 knowledge of Kazakh is mandatory for all
public sector jobs. Kazakhification has also taken over the labor market. In 1995, 64.2
percent of government jobs were held by Kazakhs, 21 percent by Russians. Within the
year, the percentage of government jobs held by Kazakhs rose to 81.4 percent (Dave
2007). Although Kazakhization reflects, in part, a backlash against its predecessor, many
identify the state as an extension of the Kazakh nation. Unlike others who separate
nationality and ethnicity into two distinct categories, many Kazakhs in a 1995-1996 poll
saw Kazakh nationality and ethnicity as interchangeable (Sultanov 2012). Even as
recently as February 6, 2014, President Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to look into
5

changing Kazakhstan’s name to Kazakh Eli or “Land of Kazakhs,” hinting at the idea that
Kazakh is both a nationality and ethnicity.
Yet even with this resurgence in identity politics, women have been sidelined
across all ethnicities. Under the USSR, women in Kazakhstan held 30 percent of all
parliamentary seats (most in the lower chamber), due to the old Soviet quota system.
During the Communist period, 20-25 percent of the nationally elected representatives in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia had been reserved for women; their levels of
participation in local and regional politics were among the highest worldwide. Even
though many conditions under Communism shaped and limited women’s influence in
national politics, adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology ensured women a minimum
level of participation in national and local party politics (Kunovich 2003). Under the
Kazakhification, however, gender quotas were eliminated as a symbol of Russian
dominance. The “women’s question” championed under communism was pushed to the
margins, in order to advance a Kazakh national identity. Non-ethnic women found it
increasingly difficult to gain access to formal institutions due to new citizenship
requirements and increased nationalism.
Up until 2012, the women of Kazakhstan rarely occupied more than 11% of
legislative seats or more than 3% in President Nazarbayev’s Cabinet. However, in 2012,
women more than doubled their numbers in the bicameral parliament without
implementing gender quotas. Although this increase is significant and the country
officially claims to be undergoing a democratic transition with “open” elections,
President Nursultan Nazarbayev has continued to exercise authoritarian control since
1991.
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Kazakhstan has nonetheless become a signatory to many international treaties and
conventions in regard to promoting women’s equal treatment, such as the United
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(1982), which it ratified in 1998. Although women have only recently increased their
political foothold in Kazakhstan, they do outrank men in regard to educational
attainment. Due to mandatory schooling until the eleventh grade, 98 percent of all women
and 97 percent of men completed primary education. Compare that to secondary
education, where women outnumber their male counterparts, 91 percent to 82 percent,
respectively. Finally, 36 percent of the female population has pursued some form of
tertiary education, while men lag behind at 28 percent (IWRAW 2000).
Table 1.1 Gender Development Indices

Kazakhstan Gender and Development Indices
HDI by year
HDI by Gender (2013)
.686 (1990)
Women .762
.679 (2000)
Men
.721
.734 (2005)
.744 (2008)
Gender Inequality Index
.747 (2010)
.459 (2008)
.750 (2011)
.468 (2009)
.757 (2012)
.428 (2010)
.756 (2013)
Source: United Nations Development Program (2013)

Kazakhstan also is categorized as having a “high” Human Development Index
rating which has increased since independence in 1991. Even more interestingly, Human
Development Indices by gender indicates that women have a higher level of human
development compared to their male counterparts. This is probably due to the disparity
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between life expectancy between women (70) and men (60) (Human Development Index
2013). However, even with this “improvement” in women’s human development, the
Gender Inequality Index which measures the combination of reproductive health,
political empowerment, and economic activity shows that gender inequality in
Kazakhstan remains high.
Although women have made significant strides in development, this has not
translated into higher positions of authority and decision making within government and
private institutions. This leads to the question as to what exactly has hindered women,
until recently, from gaining access to positions of power within Kazakhstan. Do women
feel as if they are increasing in over all political representation? If not, how have they
compensated for this? This dissertation seeks to answer these complex and
interconnected questions, guided by two competing frameworks.
Purpose and Conceptual Framework
Concerning female political representation, historical institutionalism and social
constructivism debate whether material or cultural features most influence whether
women are granted not only access to political institutions but also full representation
within these institutions. Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that real world outcomes
differ based on institutional dynamics; historical dynamics thus influence current and
future outcomes. Social constructivism, by contrast, posits that in order to understand
current power relationships within society, one must look at how institutions and groups
are culturally situated. At the center of this debate is whether material forces influence
ideas, or if ideas influence current institutional dynamics I argue that both are important
in understanding female representation in Kazakhstan.
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The purpose of this research is to first examine each framework as it relates to
Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) dimensions of representation using Kazakhstan as the case study.
After applying these frameworks to female representation in Kazakhstan and
demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of applying each framework individually, I
attempt to merge these competing frameworks into one model to offer an overall
explanation as to whether or not women in Kazakhstan are truly represented in all
dimensions as categorized by Pitkin.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The overarching research question within this study centers on what factors have
influenced the level of female political representation within Kazakhstan. Under the
frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism, I specifically ask how
women’s access to political institutions have changed following independence from the
Soviet Union and how the role of women has been transformed since the subsequent rise
of ethnic nationalism and return to traditional cultural values. I hypothesize that although
Kazakhstan claims that it is a democratizing country, the levels of female political
representation have decreased in regards to formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic
representation. I further contend that this reduction is a result of Kazakhstan’s attempt to
break from its Soviet past and to reconstruct the Kazakh identity.
Significance of Research
The significance of this dissertation lies in its efforts to understand why women’s
access to political institutions remains uneven concerning the four dimensions of female
political representation. Combining multiple theoretical frameworks into one multifaceted approach allows us not only to see how individual influences interact with female
9

political representation but also how these influences overlap and interact with each
other, providing a “big picture” of female political representation in Kazakhstan. This
allows me to examine the main research question using a multi-level approach.
Regarding frameworks, several contributions emerge. Although historical
institutionalism and its relationship to path dependency offer a comprehensive
explanation as to how formal institutions in post-Soviet Kazakhstan have developed into
what they are today, adding social constructivism clarifies how the resurgence of ethnic
nationalism in Kazakhstan has pushed women to the sidelines in some dimensions of
representation during the transformation from a communist regime to a “democratizing”
one. Although descriptive representation has increased significantly since 2006, the idea
of the need for stability over freedom (learned from its Soviet past), as reflected in the
example of symbolic representation, is important because it demonstrates how
democratization process is not constant and often uneven due to institutional and cultural
barriers.
Gender theorists (Krook 2012; Fox & Lawless 2004) argue that the greater
number of women in formal institutions the “better” a country will be. However, the case
study of Kazakhstan provides an argument that even with an increase of descriptive
representation, sometimes an individual politician, even a male politician may provide
more protection or guarantees to women, rather than a critical mass alone. It is important
to remember that prior to independence women comprised 25% of the USSR legislatures
yet had very little voice.
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Conceptually, this dissertation also expands the dimensions of representation to
include informal institutions and civil society. If a lack of civil society of over eighty
years, combined with political, economic, and social trends reduces women to the
“peasantry” of society, the conceptualization and the impact of civil society in
transforming authoritarian regimes becomes suspect. Therefore, this dissertation also
examines how women have utilized non-governmental organizations to overcome formal
barriers of political institutions.
This research also adds a Central Asian dimension to the picture and contributes
on the literature on women’s participation within post-Soviet states. A large number of
western democratization theorists focus on Robert Dahl’s seminal argument that
democratization involves procedures and inclusiveness. Accordingly, “…a political
system then is not democratic unless there is widespread participation in democratic
institutions” (Caraway 2004:455). Most early research, limited to male suffrage (i.e.,
studies by Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992), does not explain the role that
cultures play in determining why many nations rank at the bottom of the list in terms of
the proportion of women in parliament (Norris, Inglehart, and Wetzel 2004). Seymour
Lipset 1951) argues that as long as a country develops economically and become more
stable, it will no longer tolerate oppressive regimes and transform itself into a democratic
society. Historical institutionalist, Barrington Moore Jr. counters that this is not always
the case and that much depends on a country’s distinct road; democratization cannot
occur without the necessary presence of a bourgeoisie (See Chapter 2 for Moore’s
argument). Both studies fail to explain why it is that once “revolutionary” countries
democratize (fair and free elections, equal rule of law, active political and civil
11

participation by the citizenry, and protection of human rights), women are forced to the
periphery and faced with further forms of discrimination within the public sector (Funk
1993). Therefore, by drawing upon theoretical frameworks to examine political
participation in Kazakhstan, I build a more complete analysis of the barriers that continue
to limit women’s political participation.
Methodology
To assess whether historical institutionalism or social constructivism adequately
depicts the levels of female representation, I conducted field research from August 2013
to September 2013 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, based at the top ranking university within the
country, KIMEP University. Although Almaty is the former capital of Kazakhstan, it
remains the most populated city and the center of civil society in Kazakhstan, with over
200 NGOs headquartered there. Unable to interview my intended target population, I
resorted to interviewing staff from three separate entities (Non-governmental
Organizations, academics, and university students) to better understand the political,
historical, and social dynamics shaping female representation in Kazakhstan. These
interviews were semi-structured, focusing on a) forms of representation before and after
independence; b) policy domains that have allowed for the greatest female influence; c)
the role of patriarchalism and other cultural norms; and d) methods employed by women
to gain access to closed institutions.
Beyond these interviews, I also accessed official documents, journal articles,
contemporary reports and news articles from media outlets found in Kazakhstan.
Unfortunately most media under governmental control: President Nazarbayev’s daughter
owns the media conglomeration in Kazakhstan, and all media outlets are banned from
12

promoting any “anti-government” propaganda. Those caught soliciting against the
government are shut down and/or arrested. Furthermore, upon personal investigation
while in Almaty, I encountered while searching the internet that government censorship
of many Western websites, anti-Kazakhstan blogs, EU and UN documents, etc.
Limitations
The limitations found within in this study stem from my field research in
Kazakhstan. As mentioned in the introduction, I spent 25 days as compared to the
initially planned three to six months in Kazakhstan due to changing US-Kazakhstan Visa
requirements. Furthermore, my visa limited my travel to Almaty. I chose this site for my
field research because it is the hub of non-governmental organizations focusing on female
issues; it is also the most populous city within Kazakhstan with a diverse population.
Furthermore, my original target population was reduced to a fraction of my original
intended sample, thus limiting the types of questions asked, due to time constraints and
institutional barriers increasing the likelihood of community bias because of snowballing.
Snowball sampling occurs when one interviewee suggests another participant or
respondent to be interviewed increasing the likelihood that I would individuals or entities
that share common interests or viewpoints. This can lead to important segments of
society such as rural elites being omitted from the sample and skewing the analysis. To
the best of my abilities, I controlled for wrong anchoring (See Chapter 3) to ensure that
this preliminary sample reflects a larger target population. I did this by interviewing three
types of groups (academics, students, and staff at non-governmental organization).This
allows for triangulation, decreasing inaccurate conclusions about the role of women in
Kazakhstan.
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This leads to the final and most important drawback concerning this research.
Because of the small sample of elite women and elite university of students, my results
may not accurately reflect the attitudes towards female representation in Kazakhstan.
Although I went to Kazakhstan with only one on-the-ground contact who tried to help me
increase the number of interviews conducted, my interviews centered on elite Almaty
women. Therefore, the findings found within in this analysis serve only as a stepping
stone into further research on an understudied phenomena, female representation in an
often forgotten part of the world.
Outline of Research
This dissertation is divided into six chapters, including the introductory chapter.
Chapter Two offers an overview of previous research on representation and gender.
Highlighting historical institutionalism and social constructivism, it illustrates the
strengths and weaknesses of previous research within each framework. Chapter Two then
bridges the two frameworks focusing on formal (institutional) and informal (civil society)
mechanisms driving female political representation. Chapter Three describes the research
design and methodology applied in examining factors that influence female political
participation in the case study of Kazakhstan. Chapter Four applies historical
institutionalism to Pitkin’s dimensions of gender representation in Kazakhstan. Similarly,
Chapter 5 applies social constructivism to these dimensions of gender representation in
Kazakhstan. Chapter Six concludes by merging these two frameworks into one
overarching analysis on female representation in Kazakhstan.
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Chapter Two:
Competing Theories in Pursuit of a Complex Issue
Introduction
Women face serious problems of under representation, even in established
democracies. Within the United States women only hold 100 seats out of 535 in the most
recent election (Center for American Women and Politics 2014). Therefore, it comes as
little surprise that women in transitioning countries, such as former Soviet states, might
find it difficult to gain political representation when so much power is at stake. Some of
the challenges that women confront as a country moves from an authoritarian communist
regime to a democracy with a market economy include increased unemployment,
domestic violence and reduction of state benefits (McMahon 2004:251). The barriers
women face in their efforts to gain equal representation in formal institutions cannot be
explained by way of a single theoretical framework. Instead, one needs to consider the
interplay of several frameworks to understand why women in transitional societies are
more poorly represented under “democracy” than under the old regime. Kazakhstan
offers a unique case study for gender theorists because of its Soviet past entwined with its
rise in cultural patriarchialism and ethnic nationalism.
This dissertation draws on two specific frameworks: Historical
Institutionalism/Path Dependency and Social Constructivism. It also briefly touches on
Gender Representation and Civil Society literature. Although women in Kazakhstan have
made progress in terms of representation, the scholarly literature connecting barriers to
female political representation and women’s mobilization in Central Asia is limited; not
only is civil society a recent development in Central Asia but the women’s question has
15

often been pushed to the side in policy formulation in promotion of ethnic nationalism.
Most scholarship on women’s representation in this region fails to consider cultural
factors blocking the transition from civil society to formal institutions.
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that in order to explain contemporary
developments, we need to trace how historical developments have shaped current
political dynamics (Immergut 1992; Steinmo 2007). This requires an examination of
Kazakhstan’s Soviet legacy and its influence on current institutional arrangements since
the 1990s.
For purposes of comparative analysis, HI theorists contend that time and
sequencing are crucial in explaining how earlier systemic choices and institutional
patterns pre-shape current developments. Hall and Taylor (1995) argue that historical
development is one of the key influences pushing institutional dynamics along a set of
“paths.” The concept of path dependency holds great explanatory power with regard to
current outcomes under historical institutionalism because it provides for policy variation
among countries.
Paul Pierson (2000) defines path dependency as a social process:
Grounded in a dynamic of “increasing returns”…specific patterns of time
and sequence matter; various social outcomes may be possible; larger
consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events;
particular course of actions, once introduced can be almost impossible to
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reverse; political development is punctuated by moments or junctures that
shape contours of social life (2000:251).
These critical junctures send countries along different institutional reform and
policy formulation trajectories. Thus two countries may experience the same critical
juncture (the fall of the Soviet Union). But the path each country chooses to follow
thereafter depends on earlier constructions of key institutions. Barrington Moore, Jr.
argues that the development of modern political institutions among pre-modern agrarian
societies has depended on a strong bourgeoisie. His argument, “No bourgeoisie, no
democracy” holds that without a historical presence of a strong bourgeoisie, a liberal
democracy will cease to emerge because of the need for a balance between royalty and
the land owners who sought support from upper class townsmen. Bernhard (2004:3)
exerts that when “the bourgeoisie is strong enough, the aristocracy is able to adapt itself
to the emerging structures of the market, allowing for both commercial success and
control of rural populations (although not without considerable human costs).” Without a
strong bourgeoisie, two possibilities arise: a fascist dictatorship or communism.
Table 2.1 offers a narrative illustration of Moore’s thesis on the development on modern
society.
Table 2.1 Moore’s Modern Development of Political Institutions
Strength of
Bourgeoisie
Strong

Type of Revolutionary
Transition
Bourgeois

Resulting Modern
Society
Liberal Democracy

Weak

Revolution from Above

Fascist Dictatorship

Non-Existent

Peasant Revolution

Communism
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According to Moore, if the bourgeoisie has the strength to change the feudal
structure and adapt to market changes while regulating and controlling agricultural labor
through economic competition, a liberal democracy will emerge. However, if the
bourgeoisie is weak and forced to align itself with the “state” because it is unable to
handle the accelerated rate of modernization, a revolution from above will occur, leading
to the emergence of a fascist dictatorship, highlighted with an authoritarian charismatic
leader who promotes the idea of a strong state at the expense of the people. Under this
transition, there will be an increase in nationalism, a more formalized military, and
reduction of internal tariffs to promote internal economic growth. Moore uses Nazi
Germany and Japan as examples.
The third arrangement occurs when the bourgeoisie is relatively non-existent, and
reforms undertaken by the state only exacerbate the already horrible living conditions of
the peasantry, resulting in a peasantry with “the possibility of revolution” (Bernhard
2004:5). Yet as Bernhard and other critics (Skopcol) are quick to point out, Moore has a
hard time explaining how Eastern European countries that once under USSR influence
were able to transition relatively smoothly to a liberal democracy without the required
presence of a strong bourgeoisie and why others are under authoritarian regimes as is the
case in Kazakhstan. Although Moore wrote at a time where there was not the external
force of the European Union that helped define their trajectory and is less applicable to
former Second and Third World states, Moore’s description of a transition to a fascist
dictatorship does hint at some of the institutional dynamics taking place within
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Kazakhstan and how path dependent behavior and historical context surrounding
individual nations explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in Central Asia.
Discussing Kazakh national identity Ingvar Svanberg (1996) argues that despite
the complex history of nomadic tribes dating back to the 13th century, coupled with
economic and structural dependence on the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, Kazakhstan
stands as a potential geopolitical power. Its ability to develop its natural resources has
nonetheless been hindered by institutional dynamics. Svanberg highlights historical
events such as the relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan at the turn of the century to help
build farming and mining industries, coupled with Russification policies, i.e., as language
requirements meant to strengthen Soviet control over Central Asia. The genocide of
1932-1933, rooted in an intentional famine induced by the Bolsheviks, claimed over ten
millions lives within Central Asia and parts of the Ukraine. These historical events and
the constant limitation on national identity within Kazakhstan help explain the push
towards a resurgence of Kazakh national identity after the fall of the Soviet Union.
In her pivotal study of Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power, Bhavna
Dave (2007) draws the connection between the previous Russification process and the
current Kazakhization policies taking place since independence. Since the fall of the
Soviet Union (followed by the continuous non-contested elections of Nazarbayev), there
has been an increase in the promotion of Kazakh nationalism. Michael Huysseune
(2006:2) argues that the “emergence of nationalism of cultural and ethnic minorities is to
be understood as a reaction against policies of cultural homogenization of nation-stated.”
In other words, the nationalism that is taking over in Kazakhstan does not come as a
surprise as nationalism is most likely to arise in previously occupied or colonized states
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in which the citizens were forced to assimilate to a dominant or controlling culture. Thus,
the current language requirements for all “elected” officials and the push for a new
written history are to be expected. Interestingly, since most pre-Soviet Kazakhs were
nomadic, illiterate, and lacking basic community or village social structures, no real
written “Kazakh” history existed prior to the late 19th century (Dave 2007).
The revival of cultural nationalism in Kazakhstan has led to tensions among
ethnic groups. Although political power rests with Kazakh elites, most notably,
Nazarbayev, economic, industrial, and educational resources have remained largely in the
hands of the Russian minorities. Jonathan Murphy (2006) argues that although significant
institutional changes have occurred within Kazakhstan, the market is still controlled by
the same elites who ran the state prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. Former members of
the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) have simply exchanged the cloak of
communism for the mantle of nationalism to protect their agenda and interests. This
supports Moore’s argument that a weak bourgeoisie must align itself with the state and
the promotion of nationalism in order to maintain its interests.
Social Constructivism
However, the nationalism taking root in Kazakhstan has largely ignored the
increase of ethnic-religious nationalism taking place within neighboring countries such as
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This relationship between religion, ethnicity, and national
identity leads to a consideration of the social construction of identity, as it affects
institutional dynamics in Kazakhstan and the post-Soviet republics. According to
Kathleen Thelen (1999), institutions are a reflection of cultural norms and the way in
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which a society understands how the world works. These structures of human association
are shaped less by material or market forces than by the interaction of shared ideas
(Wendt 1999). Hardly fixed or concrete, categories such as gender, race, ethnicity and
class are not natural or biological and can change over time and across cultures. Rather,
they transform as ideas evolve; they are transformed by history and in turn they
themselves transform history (Amott and Mattaei 1996). History provides a social context
for understanding contemporary political culture.
In regard to Kazakhstan, Edward Schatz (2000) claims that due to Kazakhstan’s
past, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a cultural/ethnic revival is increasing.
He contends that rather than pushing towards a sustainable form of Kazakh national
unity, this revival is dividing ethnic Kazakhs against themselves, e.g., urban and rural
Kazakhs, and Kazakhs against Russians. Because of both direct and indirect forms of
inter-ethnic discrimination, there has been an across the board reduction of ethnic
Russians holding civil service/state posts within Kazakhstan: from 50% in 1991 to 25%
in 1998 (Schatz 2000).
Inter-ethnic discrimination is not the only type witnessed in the new republic.
Kathleen Collins (2003) considers the extent to which the historical presence of clans in
Central Asia has influenced current political institutions. Given that Central Asia is a
highly multi-ethnic region with no clear geographical boundaries to divide diverse subgroups into individual states, clans have provided a sense of structure, providing a
framework for political institutions. The clans themselves serve as fundamental political
structures within these communities, supporting the concept of an “imagined
community.” According to Benedict Anderson (1983), an imagined community,
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specifically a nation, is comprised of individuals who seem themselves as part of a group
that is not based on day-to-day interactions (i.e., family, friends, co-workers). These
transient groups are based on social identities that change as ideas evolve. They dictate
the norms or rules of the society and who is allowed to have a voice or must remain
silent.
Representation and Gender
Since the main focus of this dissertation is to examine the factors hindering
women from fully integrating themselves into political institutions, we must explore
representation theory. In 1967, Hanna Pitkin identified four integrated but albeit
analytically separate dimensions of representation: formal, descriptive, substantive, and
symbolic. While most research focuses on one or two dimensions (Salmond 2006;
Atkeson 2003; Carrillo 2007; Mansbridge 2009), Pitkin argues that separating these
dimensions is impossible due to their causal connectedness. In other words, formal
institutions facilitate descriptive representation, encourage policy responsiveness, and
enhance the public’s support for representation. Descriptive representation is moreover
considered crucial for promoting symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler
2005:410).
In defining the pertinent characteristics of each dimension, I reflect on techniques
suggested for each in regards to female political representation. This section also then
turns to the relevance of each dimension within Kazakhstan, briefly examining how the
“female” experience is or is not leading to women in Kazakhstan’s overall feeling of
being represented.
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Formal representation refers to the rules, norms, and procedures shaping how
representatives are selected. This can include types of political institutions, who is able to
run, and the ways in which candidates are selected. Much of the literature assesses
whether the type of voting system affects female representation, Ian McCallister and
Donley Studler (2002) found that women were ten percent more likely to be elected in
proportional representation systems versus single-member districts. This is attributed to
evidence that political parties (often dominated by men) are more willing to nominate
women and minorities in a multi-member district than in a district that only carries one
seat (Matland 2008; Brown 1992; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).
However, a 62-nation study discovered that there is no relationship between
electoral rules and the percentage of women in parliament (Inglehart and Norris 2003). In
a cross-sectional time series of countries undergoing major changes in their electoral
rules, Rob Salmond (2006) found that the effect of PR systems on levels of female
representation is indeed positive, but the effect has been overstated (Matland 2008).
Many of these studies assume that a positive effect on female representation is reflected
in numerical representation; yet none explain whether or not a change in formal rules
affects whether women “feel” more represented by these women.
A focus on descriptive representation raises the question as to whether there is a
“compositional similarity between representatives and the represented” Pitkin (1967:1011). She asks whether likes are truly representing likes. Most research focuses on
descriptive representation because it is easy to count the number of women in parliament
in over 180 countries, allowing for statistical analysis and cross-country comparisons
(Krook 2010).
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Initially revolving around the idea of critical mass theory, Drude Dahlerup (1988)
argues that a “threshold number [or percentage] of women in a legislature is necessary for
transforming the legislative context from one in which women-friendly policy is unlikely
to one in which the opportunities for women’s policy success are increased” (Mansbridge
2005:222). Under critical mass theory, an increase in descriptive representation would
lead to a natural increase in substantive representation. Mansbridge (1999) contends that
one reason for critical mass is to convince members of the majority party coalition of the
interests that they are advancing is widely held within that group. Yet, Dahlerup
acknowledges that the everyday significance of critical mass has gotten lost in
translation. Instead of focusing on the attainment of parity, focus should be on the critical
acts, e.g., gender quota adoption that even a minority organization can undertake to
empower women. The numbers and proportion of women holding parliamentary seats are
only of minor importance in terms of policy outcomes depending on the political system.
Policymakers should focus on actions that include women in the discourse.
The most common critical act described for increasing descriptive representation
is the introduction of gender quotas. However, the “act of gender quota adoptions” is
often the culminating event of previous critical acts. Critical acts depend on the
“willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the organization to
improve the situation for themselves and the whole minority group” (Dahlerup 1998:
296). These acts include consciousness-raising, building a policy community,
professionalization and internationalization, and the most recognized- institutionalization
and gender mainstreaming (Mushaben 1999). Furthermore, these critical acts do not have
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to be initiated by only women or minority groups. In fact, both men and women may be
actors in formulating gender equitable policies.
For this research, causal connectedness between formal/institutional design and
descriptive representation is seen through the ultimate “critical act” of gender quota
implementation: institutional design affords selected groups greater descriptive
representation than they might achieve under existing electoral systems, bringing the
proportions of those groups in the legislature closer to the share of the general population
(Mansbridge 1997).This suggests that women would have been better represented under
the old Soviet quota system compared to non-gender quota societies.
Several other concerns arise when the focuses rests primarily with increasing
numerical representation. The first, essentialism, assumes that “members of a certain
group have an essential identity that all members of that group share which with no
others can partake” (Mansbridge 1997:637). Secondly, intersectionality and multiple
identities may be just as or even more significant when it comes to applying gender
quotas or critical mass theory to women in Kazakhstan. Overlapping identities are neither
additive, nor easily separated; rather they are mutually constitutive. Investigating black
women’s employment in the United States, Kimberlie Crenshaw (1983) argued that
women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently
pursue conflicting agendas. The idea that members of one population necessarily
represent all members of that population equally is erroneous because of the lack of
shared experiences.
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Nevertheless, without some levels of descriptive representation women cannot
hope to attain symbolic representation. Often seen as an extension of descriptive
representation, symbolic representation is the ability of a symbol’s power to “evoke
feelings or attitudes” (Pitkin 1967:97). Symbolic representation frames itself in relation to
the effect that women’s presence has on voter perceptions of politics as a male domain
(Krook 2010). It asks whether the presence of women in elected positions provides
legitimacy to current political institutions. Conclusions regarding symbolic representation
are mixed. Several studies find that both female and male respondents believe that
governments are more democratic when women are more visible within the process
(Karp and Barducci 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). This supports rational
actor theorists who argue that citizens’ support for political institutions depends largely
on whether constituencies view their institutions as legitimate (Jackman and Miller 1996;
Mishler and Rose 2001; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Others agree that women’s
inclusion sends signals to female to the female citizenry, rendering them more politically
efficacious (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007:94-95).
Largely conducted in Western and developed countries, many studies show that
educational levels influence whether gender serves as a cue for political attitudes.
Women with higher levels of education are less likely to vote for women simply because
of a candidate is female (Lawless 2004; McDermott 2008) because they no longer require
visual cues as means of deciding on whom to vote. Unfortunately, most studies on
symbolic representation focus on women in the United States and less on developing
countries where women’s rights are pushed aside even today.
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Of the four dimensions of representation, Pitkin (1967) argues that substantive
representation holds the most importance because under substantive representation the
wishes of the represented and the actions of the representatives are expected to converge
(Pitkin 1967: 163-165). Substantive representation asks whether there is “articulation of
policy concerns by specific office holders” (Krook 2010:234). Furthermore,
representatives should behave as delegates when they represent. Substantive
representation maintains that not only women but also men may meet the needs of their
constituency when they overlap in other ways (e.g., religion, etc.). Although an increase
in women could push men towards more gender sensitive policies, such developments
could also trigger se1ver backlash (Krook 2010), as seen in Iran after 1979 and other socalled Islamic states. Second, small numbers of women may be more beneficial because
these women can specialize without stepping on their male counterparts’ “toes.”
One way to achieve substantive representation may include gender mainstreaming
policies, such as illustrated by various United Nations Development Programs and World
Bank’s initiatives. Within their action plans, these programs integrate a gendered
dimension into their daily operations, lending practices, and strategic planning in their
goals of reducing poverty and increasing sustainable development within these
developing countries (World Bank 2002). Gender mainstreaming policies are supposed to
include four elements: “1) measurement and monitoring (which means finding out what
the situation of women and men is in a specific policy area), 2) implementation (which
generally implies a policy analysis looking at the implications of an intended policy for
gender relations and aiming to improve it, 3) creating awareness, ownership and
understanding among stakeholders to lead improved policy making in the future, and 4)
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gender proofing and evaluation to see the extent to which intended policies have had
gender effects” (European Commission 2008: 11). However, gender mainstreaming
policies have been slow to take hold within all areas, highlighting one of its main
criticisms. Although gender mainstreaming calls for the inclusion of women at all stages
of the policy process, the literature often ignores who would be better at promoting
women’s issues. Therefore, if women are unable to achieve representation within the
system, a discussion of how women overcome this is needed. We turn now to the
literature on civil society and its relationship to female representation in Kazakhstan.
Civil Society
“Civil Society” is a concept often identified by its characteristics but not easily
defined in a way that includes all permutations. In 2010, the World Bank adopted a
definition of “civil society” that reads:
The term civil society refers to the array of non-governmental and not-for
profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the
interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural,
political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations. Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of unions,
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations,
professional associations and foundations (World Bank 2010).
Although it highlights possible contributing organizations, this definition
overlooks the goal of civil society. Alexis de Tocqueville (1935) depicts civil society as a
space for private entrepreneurship and civil affairs regulated only by the rule of law.
28

Against the notion of individualism, de Tocqueville introduced the idea of civil
associations for promoting reciprocity and trust among citizens in a democratic polity.
Michael Foley and Bob Edwards extend this notion, describing civil society as a “sphere
of action that is independent and can engage in resistance to a tyrannical regime”
(1996:2). Olivier Roy (2005) counters, however, that civil society cannot be universally
applied when discussing democratization, insofar as it overlooks the cultural and
historical context and the needs of the society to be effective in providing a voice to its
citizens, it must work within existing political institutions. Roy further claims that the
models of democratization and civil society promoted by Western scholars are
inappropriate for assessing Central Asia and Middle East developments; the concept is
often seen by locals (for good or bad reasons) to embody an idealized, abstract model of
modern western society. It is seen to have resulted from a historical process which took
centuries to evolve but which is now presented as a ready-made, compulsory blue-print
for reforms to be implemented in “oriental” societies in the span of one generation; there
is often a suspicion that what lies behind it is a hidden agenda, ranging from political
control, access to oil, or to religious ideology.
If the support for civil society is to develop at all, civil society has to help
transform a tyrannical regime into a more democratic one. Experts like de Tocqueville
(1935), Habermas (1989) and Putnam (2000) posit that civic associations and increased
social capital through human interactions force governments to become more accountable
to citizens by serving as a thermometer for the mood of citizens while ensuring that their
needs and rights are being met. The connection between civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rests with the fact that NGOs are the driving force of
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change because of their ability to organize communities, provide voice to the minority,
and work closely with political institutions. Representing only one type of possible
association, local, domestic, and international NGOs play an important role in
empowering disadvantaged groups; they are not only crucial in the formation of civil
society but also in the transformation of political institutions because of their ability to
bridge the gap between both the public sphere and governmental organizations.
However, there is an overall concern regarding the ability of NGOs to produce
real change as to whether these organizations might impede the democratization process.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (2005) claim that one technique activists employ
is known as the boomerang effect which involves domestic activism seeking allies in the
international arena, who have, in turn, the ability to exert influence on the host country to
change its existing policies due to international pressure. The issue rests in whether
change due to NGO influence is legitimate or whether their influence is superficial. Riker
argues that NGOs in Indonesia were able to instigate democratic change through
successfully lobbying to the international community. However, Indonesia ranks 110th
out of 180 countries on the Transparency International’s Corruption Index (2011) due to
corruption and illegitimate practices. This example emphasizes the need to critically
examine the overall effectiveness of NGOs at producing institutional change.
Even beyond corruption, in post-Soviet countries where civil society is in its
relative infancy, there is ongoing distrust affecting civil society. Elise Helen LoBue
(2007) in her discussion on Kazakhstan highlights the Soviet ban on independent public
activity outside the Communist Party control and the persisting desire for the state to
provide social needs. Given the pre-1990 history of civil organizations, there is a public
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apathy and “legacy of cynicism” surrounding contemporary civic organizations in
Kazakhstan (Riker 2002).
Furthermore, President Nazarbayev has implemented institutional constraints, in
effect limiting the type of civic organizations allowed to develop in Kazakhstan. With the
2005 Law on National Security, criminal and civil charges will be brought against any
individual who participates in any informal organizations or protests not sanctioned by
the Kazakhstan government, inherently cutting organizations that are seeking change off
at their proverbial knees and limiting any type of democratic reform. Government
restrictions on NGO functions in Kazakhstan, intended to maintain authoritarian control,
are combined with a lack of public activism, rooted in the Soviet legacy of suspicion
towards independent associations. Consequently, organizations promoting female rights
are hindered in their efforts to promote democratic reforms or societal change. Instead,
NGOs and civil society in Kazakhstan are mere shells of their international counterparts.
Conclusion
This review of the literature sets out to accomplish three distinct goals. First, it
introduces the reader to the two competing frameworks tested in this research: historical
institutionalism and social constructivism. The strength of historical institutionalism is
that it provides the reader with the understanding that past decisions or institutional
dynamics constrain present and future institutional designs. Momentous change occurs at
critical junctures when the stability of the institution is in flux; it is at these moments
when an institution has the ability to break from its path. However, often more than not,
even these “new” paths are still constrained or influenced by prior institutional
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developments. In short, historical institutionalism allows us to study what role institutions
play in structuring behavior. However, historical institutionalism often forgets about the
need for ideas and the extent to which ideas evolve, and so do institutions. Some
historical institutionalists (North 2006; Lewis and Steinmo 2007) are beginning to view
institutional change as an evolutionary process instead of fixed set of paths that are predetermined and fixed. Social Constructivism, however, fully embraces the importance of
ideas and argues that behavior and norms of a society are interpreted (or constructed)
rather than the result of simple causal connectedness. Unlike historical institutionalism
which situates individuals and society as prisoners of structural forces beyond their
control, social constructivism aims “ to understand the worlds of meaning that people
generate through interaction in order to understand how social actors define, construct
and act towards the ‘realities’ that constitute their everyday worlds” (Clapham 2009: 4).
Through these interactions, the construction of gender, ethnicity, and religion and the
norms associated with these constructs take shape. Although social constructivism
accounts for the importance of history with the acknowledgement that ideas change over
time as interactions change, social constructivism does not clearly link the causality
constraints that past institutional dynamics can impose on current institutions. In that
sense, each framework picks up where the other left off.
This chapter also provides an overview of the research subject, female political
participation, and how the previous literature fails to account for all dimensions (formal,
descriptive, substantive, and symbolic) of representation, specifically within post-Soviet
Central Asian republics. Finally, this chapter offers a glimpse into whether the role of
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civil society, in countries where civil society is still in its beginnings, can induce
institutional changes and lower barriers to excluded groups such as women.
The next chapter outlines the methodological approach utilized to examine the
influences blocking women from gaining equal representation. Chapter Three begins by
introducing the overall research problem and hypotheses tested. It then turns to a brief
discussion of qualitative methods and the importance a qualitative model carries in fully
developing a contextual understanding as to what barriers have hindered women’s access
to political institutions in Kazakhstan. After reviewing the qualitative method utilized,
Chapter Three concludes with addressing ethical concerns raised in the pursuit of this
research.
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Chapter Three:
Methodology: Testing a Complex Phenomena
Introduction
As the previous chapters demonstrate, there is much uncertainty over what factors
influence women’s access to political institutions. Historical institutionalism and social
constructivism debate as to whether material or cultural forces influence female
representation. This chapter seeks to examine not only whether internal or external,
cultural or material forces impede women from gaining access to governmental
institutions in Kazakhstan but also suggests that a qualitative method approach provide
the best framework for observing this complex phenomena.
Research Design and Rationale of Methodology
This analysis takes the form of a qualitative research study. Instead of quantitative
research methods which attempt to develop generalizable or universal laws through static
reality (or numbers), qualitative research methods understand that reality is contextual
and that universal laws often miss the specifics. Qualitative studies allow us to gain a
perspective from the people involved, often overlooked.
Further reasons for utilizing a qualitative approach versus a quantitative approach
is that it allows researchers to determine how individuals construct ideas and their own
relationship to institutions. This type of research lends itself to explaining how and why a
specific event occurred. Consequently, conducting qualitative research allows us to
explore what decisions or events necessitated the event or phenomena being studied.
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In this case, a qualitative study combining personal interviews with elite women
and university students and content analysis of official documents, media reports, and
journal articles allows me to explore why women in Kazakhstan continue to lag behind
their male counterparts in regards to political representation and to discover how a
combination of historical events and cultural identity have contributed.
Qualitative Exploratory Questions
Since this qualitative analysis examines factors hindering female representation
using a bottom-up approach, the process of identifying individual influences and their
interplay with one another (i.e., cultural norms and historical institutional development)
involves drawing inferences from the interviews and verifying these observed themes
with subsequent interviews. Therefore, conjecture as to whether a hypothesized factor is
statistically significant in influencing women’s access to political institution s is
inappropriate for this section. Instead thematic questions about the supposed barriers
were addressed to the interviewees. Some of the exploratory questions regarding
women’s access to political institutions are found in the table below.
Table 3.1 Qualitative Exploratory Research Questions
Research Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What rules exist in regards to running for political office?
How are women viewed within society?
Do women feel represented by already females within Parliament?
What barriers did women historical confront under the Soviet Union?
What barriers do women experience when actively seeking full representation?
What policy arenas are have women found the most success? Most resistance?
7. To what effect do patriarchal norms influence women’s desire/ability to run for
office?
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Sampling/Population Details
Initially, the goal of the research was to conduct interviews with elected female
officials, gender experts, political party leaders, academics, and a large focus group of
young women located in Almaty, Kazakhstan. This multi-level approach was meant to
detect a) whether intersectionality of religion, ethnicity, and gender increased the
likelihood of certain sectors of the female population being represented; and c) common
problems or influences women experienced when trying to gain access to political
institutions.
However, limited access to political leaders and time constraints required me to
focus my interviews on women in Almaty. Almaty serves as the NGO capital of Central
Asia and is the former capital of Kazakhstan. Having secured an affiliation with KIMEP
University, my research focused on interviewing three distinct groups: academics at
KIMEP University, staff members of international and local NGOs, and a focus group
consisting of four students (two female and two male) majoring in international relations
at KIMEP University. This field research was dependent on the “snow ball effect” (i.e.,
one interviewee introducing me to potential organizations/individuals) due to cultural
norms of excluding outsiders who might ask potentially personal questions. Due to my
affiliation to KIMEP University, I was granted access to the political science faculty.
However, due to scheduling conflicts I was only able to interview five faculty members
who all consented to my naming them within my research at the start of the interview. It
was through my interview with one of the professors that I gained access to students
enrolled in the Politics of International Affairs Course. Students were allowed to
volunteer to be a part of a focus group during of their class periods. Out of ten students,
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four volunteered. I separated them into male and female focus groups to allow students
to speak freely about their feelings towards female political participation and to increase
the validity of their answers. Also, beyond basic descriptive characteristics (age, gender,
ethnicity), I do not name the students to protect their privacy.
As for my interviews with staff members of NGOs, I sent emails and phone calls
to various organizations. Out of these, I was able to interview five non-governmental
organizations. Out of these, I was able to interview the staff of five non-governmental
organizations (three local and two international). Out of these organizations, only one
requested to not be identified by the organization’s name. The director allowed me to use
her name, but for the protection of the organization and the interviewee, I coded the
organization as Women’s Entrepreneurship and removed all identifying characteristics
beyond a basic description of their goals and target audience.
I chose this sample of the population because these individuals represent the
middle and upper class segment of society and are the most well-informed regarding
female political participation in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, if female and male
interviewees believe that women are disenchanted with the political process in
Kazakhstan due to internal and external influences, one can assume that this feeling
trickles down to the lower classes of society. However, I acknowledge that without
interviewing rural elites that there is a probable skew regards to symbolic representation
since political elites are going to want to maintain some levels of democratization in
order to continue to receive aid and funding from NGOs. Based on readings and primary
resources, political elites often set up their own NGOs or align with NGOs in order to
receive funding. By exploiting NGOs, the political elites have the ability to increase
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private gain by “intercept[ing] development aid to run programs that in another era might
have managed by a governmental agency” (Gros 2011:214-215). Thereby, the
implication of my sample size largely consisting of NGO staff could potentially conflate
the overall results. It is important to reiterate that this analysis is preliminary research
meant to stimulate further studies. It offers a snapshot of the barriers women face in
Kazakhstan.
Instrumentation
Following a self-designed rubric (See Appendix A), the interviews conducted
were semi-structured in order to allow those being interviewed to express themselves in
their own words and to allow for follow-up questions. The rubric found in Appendix A
represents the questions meant to ask in my initial study. Due to circumstances already
described, many of these questions went unasked due to the population of the sample.
However, my work included human observation and detailed note taking (many of the
interviewees did not want to be audio or video recorded); each interview with the staff
from the NGOs and the faculty at KIMEP University lasted approximately sixty to ninety
minutes and was located at a place of their choice. Those who are affiliated with KIMEP
University were interviewed on KIMEP’s campus, while NGO interviews were
conducted at their offices, homes, or at local coffee shops. Although a questionnaire was
used, a majority of interviews expanded beyond the questionnaire (i.e., from
generalizable themes to concrete details and normative evaluations). This flexibility in
interview structure allowed me to ask questions that had arisen in previous interviews to
see if there were any overall connections. I was required to use an interpreter found by a
local connection through the university only once since a majority of the interviews were
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conducted in English. It is difficult to control for translation when the interviewees did
not want to be audio or video recorded. To ensure that no external forces (the
government) pressured my assistant to translate the conversation in ways that would skew
the actual results, I found my translator through an American graduate student attending
KIMEP University with whom I had the opportunity to interaction on several occasions.
This helps reduce some of the bias that could be present.
Data Analysis
For analyses within the case study, I apply historical institutionalism and social
constructivism to the four dimensions of representation as presented by Hanna Pitkin
(1967). I look specifically at historical institutional dynamics and the role of cultural
identity to see how these influence current gender relations in regards to formal,
descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. The interviews provide a
contextual narrative for the merging of these theoretical frameworks in understanding the
complex phenomena of female representation in Kazakhstan.
Overcoming Qualitative Inexactness
Several concerns arise when conducting interviews based upon snowball
sampling. The first issue that presents itself is community bias. Community bias infers
that those respondents interviewed first exert the most influence on the results because
they are the ones who recommend further interviews with individuals or organizations
with which they are associated (Van Meter 1990). This can lead to important members of
the population being omitted from the sample. If not controlled for, these first individuals
may skew the findings and provide inaccurate profiles of the phenomena being observed.
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Another potential problem is “wrong” anchoring.” Not only must I account for whether
or not the first respondents distort the picture, but I must also account for whether or not
the sample reflects the target population. In other words, are the issues affecting the
sample groups actually affecting women in gender or is it localized to those within the
sample?
Although bias and wrong anchoring are inevitable at some level, these issues can
be minimized by: a) increasing the sample size; b) by relying on a variety of sources; and
c) reaching isolated members of the community (Liam 2014). Since I was only able to
interview a sample of elite women in Almaty, I try to overcome this bias by interviewing
three distinct groups (NGO personnel, academics and students) providing a variety of
sources. Even with this small sample size, by interviewing a variety of groups I found
two important findings regarding female representation in Kazakhstan.
Ethical Concerns
It is important to address the potential ethical concerns when conducting such
research, especially the need to protect the identities of those wishing to remain
anonymous in their interviews. My IRB approval number for conducting interviews with
individuals in Kazakhstan is 1039875. Also, each individual interviewed as a part of this
research was first asked if she or he would allow for their identities to be associated with
their responses. All verbally acknowledged that they would allow the comments collected
from these interviews to be used in my study. Only one organization refused to be
identified but allowed the interview to be conducted and the information received to be
coded as local non-governmental organization associated with female entrepreneurship.
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This organization also allowed me to identify its staff members by name within my
research. However, I made the decision to withhold any individual names this
organization allowed as an added measure of anonymity.
Merging Analysis
Since this research blends historical institutionalism and social constructivism
into one conceptual framework, the final chapter merges historical institutionalism as it
relates to formal and descriptive representation with social constructivism as it related to
substantive and symbolic female representation in Kazakhstan. By analyzing where these
two frameworks produce similar results, differ completely, or enhance a better contextual
understanding of female representation, I will accomplish the two main goals of this
research. First, I determine what factors are hindering female political participation in
Kazakhstan. Second, the results from the overall analysis allow for an examination of
whether either of these two competing frameworks alone provides explanatory power on
the current situation of female representation in Kazakhstan or whether a merging of the
two is necessary to accomplish this.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview as to the approach used to gather information
on factors influencing female political representation in Kazakhstan. By conducting a
qualitative study which utilized on-the-ground interviews with local elites, I provide a
contextual analysis for female representation in Kazakhstan, albeit preliminary, on the
overall development of female representation. Having discussed the rationale behind this
methodological approach, the research questions, the instruments use to gather the data
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and the limitations present, the next chapter presents a substantive analysis of historical
institutionalism and its interplay with two types of female representation in Kazakhstan.
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Chapter Four:
Break with the Past or Follow in its Footsteps: Historical
Institutionalism in Kazakhstan
Re-Introduction of Historical Institutionalism in Kazakhstan
Historical Institutionalism involves looking at historic causality (Page 2006),
examining how institutions have developed certain patterns and configurations based
upon institutional configurations which, in turn, shape decisions about future political
institutions. Commonly used for country-level comparisons, historical institutionalism
seeks to answer how and why countries that were once formally similarly situated vary in
regards to subsequent institutional design or policy adoption.
These types of questions lead to understanding the path-dependent behavior of
institutions and decision makers and the variation that occurs. According to Capoccia and
Keleman (2007:431), dynamic institutional variation occurs after “relatively long periods
of path-dependent stability, where dramatic change can occur when there is a brief phase
of influx.” These influxes, or critical junctures, set national leaders and their institutional
arrangements on paths are difficult to alter. In other words, during these critical junctures
more choices open to decision makers, and there is likelihood that these choices will have
much more of a momentous impact, resulting in the disparity between institutional
configurations between countries.
Kazakhstan had two opportunities to break with its past, in 1917 when it
succumbed to the Soviet Union and in 1991 when it declared its independence. This
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study seeks to understand the shifts in level of representation in Kazakhstan by first
exploring its historical institutional legacy as an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union
and the path that the Republic of Kazakhstan chose at its second critical juncture,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter then turns to representation and
seeks to understand how Kazakhstan’s decision to break from its Soviet past not only
diminished female representation but also reduces women’s roles in society in the public
sphere.
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing Kazakhstan’s historic and current
institutional dynamics. I utilize interviews with elite women and university students, and
combining information from documents, journal articles, and media sources. The next
section analyzes how female representation in Kazakhstan has been transformed, as a
result of departing from its previous path. I then examine the consequence of both
diverging and maintaining certain characteristics of its former institutional framework.
The final section provides an assessment of the applicability of historical institutionalism
to understanding female political representation, highlighting its strengths and
weaknesses. I present an alternative theory to fill in the gaps left unanswered under the
historical institutionalist framework.
Historical Kazakhstan: Pre-Soviet and Soviet Era
In search of a Kazakh identity and clear a break from its historic past as of 1991,
Kazakhstani leaders have often promoted the idea of the return to a traditional identity.
However, this Kazakh history is one full of folklore; written documents detailing historic
institutions prior to Soviet rule are limited. Historically, Kazakhstan was populated by

44

nomadic tribes with no history. In place of biographical accounts, genealogies, customs,
rule of law traveled down by oral tradition (Mullerson 2014). This is pertinent because
the traditions often associated with nomadic people of Kazakhstan have been malleable to
appease the wants and desires of those in power.
The lack of written history also allowed for the permeation of Russian dominance
in the early 19th century after Russian tsars invaded Central Asia, implementing policies
such as the removal of all previous Kazakh history in order to ensure state control over a
multi-ethnic population. This continuous removal of ethnic Kazakh identity elements
continued when Kazakhstan became an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union.
In order to understand Kazakhstan’s desire to break from its Soviet past, a brief
review of Soviet political and economic institutions is necessary. Five of the most easily
identifiable characteristics of governmental institutions operating within the Soviet Union
that has trickled down to its republics, including the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
were 1) one-party dominant structure (Central Communist Party) that paralleled state
structures; with 2) the fact that the final approval lies in in the central of the structure at
all levels with final approval remaining with the Politburo. 3) Democratic centralism
allowed members of the party to “debate” policy, but once a decision had been reached
all members were expected to uphold the decision; 4) the policies of nomenklatura that
guaranteed all important posts were filled by loyal party members. This led to the
homogenization of policies across the entire Soviet Union. Parallel party and government
structures appeared at local, city, oblast, republic, and all-union levels. The head of the
party was simultaneously the office holder heading the equivalent state positions, and 5)
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administrative federalism promoting policies which are “national in form, socialist in
content.”
Under a modified parliamentary system, the “representative” component of the
government in the Soviet Union consisted of two houses: the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union was comprised of 750 deputies who were
elected from equally populated districts, similar in form (but not function) to our House
of Representatives. The Soviet of Nationalities, however, consisted of 750 deputies
representing ethnic entities across all of the Soviet Union. Although the legislative bodies
were meant to have the highest legal authority, they functioned as mere puppets of the
Presidium, comprised of top party leaders.
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Figure 4.1 Nationalities Breakdown

With the advent of glasnost and perestroika in 1986, Gorbachev revamped this to
create the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. The People’s Congress
elected the members of the Supreme Soviet to serve as a direct link between the party and
the state. Within the Supreme Soviet, which held 542 members elected for 5 year terms,
was another bicameral body: the Council of the Union. However, even with this
legislative restructuring, the Presidium remained dominant and ruled during recesses of
the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium of 39 Soviet members not only held legislative
powers but also exercised judicial powers; they could both void laws and grant clemency
and pardons.
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Most directly related to Kazakhstan was he creation of the Soviet Nationalities.
The Soviet of Nationalities guaranteed representation of all Republics, electing 32 from
each republic of the Soviet Union, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five
from each autonomous oblast, an one from each national district. The function of the
Soviet of Nationalities was to represent both national and non-ethnic Russians like.
However, after 1937, the Soviet of Nationalities was reduced to a largely symbolic body,
dealing solely with issues of national identity (Martin 2001). Meant to grant “equal
voice” in policy formation, the Soviet of Nationalities held no real power (CIA World
Fact book 1989).
Within the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Supreme Soviet and the
Supreme Council served as both the legislative branch and the judicial branch. However,
like the Supreme Soviet in the USSR, the KSSR Presidium maintained complete control.
Two bodies comprised the Supreme Soviet: the Council of Ministers, which served two
year terms; the Council of Nationalities, which was composed of 32 members of various
major ethnic groups, not limited to Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, etc. However, major
positions of power were consistently held by loyal Russians and eventually by
“Russified” Kazakhs who followed the party line (nominklatura). Unchallenged party
loyalty dated back to 1929 when all Kazakh leaders were removed from local and
regional government positions and replaced with Soviet patriots. Furthermore, Stalin’s
Purges during the 1930’s made Kazakhstan’s nomadic cultural heritage all but obsolete.
Once nomadic in function, the majority of all arable lands were used to develop large
state-run farms (Kort 2004). Also during this time, a large influx of Russians centered the
KSSR not only to seek employment on these farms but also to occupy and control
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positions in the “national” Communist Party. Therefore, ethnic Kazakhs not only lost
their culture but also modes of economic survival upon which they had long depended.
In the 1980s, riots in Kazakhstan began to increase following the removal of
Dinmukhamed Kunayev, first ethnic Kazakh to hold the position of the First Secretary
General, on the groups of corruption; he was replaced by an ethnic Russian. Eventually,
the ethnic Russian was also removed and replaced by none other than Nursultan
Nazarbayev. A clear party loyalist, Nazarbayev had joined the Communist Party in 1962.
Working his way up the party ranks, he eventually became the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers (equivalent to Prime Minister) and was even briefly considered as a
candidate for the post of second in command to Mikhail Gorbachev (McCauley 2014).
Kazakhstani Institutions Today: Chance for a Second “Break” with Past
The key in understanding political and governmental institutions in Kazakhstan is
that the government has become synonymous with President Nursultan Nazarbayev and
vice versa. Nazarbayev is the state, and the state is Nazarbayev. All assertions that the
Republic of Kazakhstan represents a democratic society with open institutions are
erroneous. Having maintained his control as the leader of Kazakhstan since he was
named First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in
1989, Nazarbayev was elected as the newly independent Republic’s first president in
December 1991. Since then, Nazarbayev has continued his “elected” reign over the
country; elections foster the illusion democracy, in what is, in fact, as system surrounded
by authoritarian rules, controlled by one man and one political party – Nur Otan.
Ironically similar to its Soviet counterpart, Kazakhstan has again become a mono-centric
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state with all levels of administration controlled by the central government and President
Nazarbayev at its head.
Although the Kazakh Constitution states that a president may only serve for two
consecutive five-year terms, these term limits do not apply to President Nazarbayev
hinting at the reversal of democratization that has taken place within Kazakhstan since
1991. In the November 2011 elections, Nazarbayev won with 95.5% of the votes, but the
elections were quickly condemned by international observers. The OSCE released a
statement that the “Reforms necessary for holding democratic elections have yet to
materialize” (BBC 2011). Furthermore, Nazarbayev himself admits to a lack of
democratization, having declared in a Washington Post article that achieving “prosperity
before democracy” is the key to Kazakhstan’s immediate future (BBC 2011). Ranked
70th out of the 187th on the Gender Equality Index and ranked “very high’ on the Human
Development Index, Kazakhstan holds a score of 5.5 for overall freedom, political rights
and civil freedoms, (based on a scale of 1 to 7, 7 being the worst) and a political freedom
score of 6 (Freedom House 2014).
Further evidence of the authoritarian chokehold Nazarbayev maintains on
Kazakhstani institutions and society is found within the political structure. Although the
national government has three distinct branches, the president exercises direct influence
over both the legislative branch and judicial branch. The legislative branch contains two
chambers: the Senate (upper) and Majilis (lower). The Senate is composed of 47
deputies, with fifteen of its members being appointed by the president. The remaining 32
deputies represent the sixteen oblasts (regions) and the major cities of Almaty and
Astana. Elections are held every three years, for six year terms. The Majilis has 105
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deputies with 98 seats, elected by party lists through proportional representation, while
the remaining seven seats are elected through single member district voting (Kazakhstan
Constitution 2014). Nazarbayev also has the power to appoint and dismiss not only the
Prime Minister but also the Chairs of both chambers.
As to the judicial branch, the President appoints three out of seven members of
the Constitutional Council, including the chairperson of the Council. The other four
members are appointed by the chairperson of the Senate and the chairperson of the
Majilis. The Supreme Court consists of 44 members appointed by the president and
approved by the Senate. The Constitution (1995) also accords President Nazarbayev the
authority to dissolve the branches as his discretion, as well as to nullify any laws
sanctioned by the other two branches (UN 2004).
In short, President Nazarbayev maintains control by appointing loyal individuals
not only to the legislative branch but also to the judicial branch. Although the Senate
chairperson and Majilis chairperson each appoint members to the Constitutional Council,
these appointments have to secure presidential approval, insofar as the president has the
authority to dismiss either chairperson. Even at the local level, regional heads (akimats)
are appointed at the discretion of president and must fully back the national government’s
agenda (thus Nazarbayev’s agenda). So even if women were appointed, they would have
little room for independent gender-actions.
Simultaneously, President Nazarbayev also wields control over political
institutions as the head of the only enduring political party in Kazakhstan: the Nur Otan.
His concurrent role as the head of state and of the nation and as leader of the predominant
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mono-party system, allows Nazarbayev to operate as the head gatekeeper for access to
governmental institutions. Even though a 2007 campaign reform allowed the registration
of at least one other political party, any party recognized is required to remain loyal to
President Nazarbayev, because it is illegal for any party opposed to the government to
form. Following the 2011 elections, two parties (Ak Zolt and the Communist People’s
Party) received eight and seven seats in the Majilis, respectively (Carnegie Endowment
2012). However, these parties are seen more as an extension of the Nur Otan rather than
as separate entities. Like the old Soviet system, gaining positions within the political
party and government institutions rests on a form of clientelism, because party lists are
closed. Party gatekeepers dictate who can be nominated and what rank they should hold
on the party lists. Clientelism represents a form of political patronage whereby material
goods (bribes) are exchanged for political support. Nazarbayev’s power is reinforced by
unrestricted corruption controlling government and shaping election processes as a
whole, all of which began with the unchecked power granted to Nazarbayev in 1991.
These structures and the interwoven connections between governmental
institutions and political parties eerily resemble parts of Kazakhstan’s Soviet past. First,
President Nazarbayev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party to head the Kazakh
Soviet Socialist Republic. This automatically shapes the type of exclusionary power
Nazarbayev hoped to maintain. Furthermore, the one-party dominant system mandating
complete and unquestioned loyalty to the existing government mirrors the Soviet past, in
which the only legal party was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like their
Soviet predecessors, party structures of the Nur Otan parallel state structures of the
Republic of Kazakhstan; ultimate authority and approval lies with central structure (or
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person) of the party. In this case, the central structure of the party and the state are one
and the same: Nazarbayev.
As a recruited member of the Soviet nomenklatura, which served as an extension
of the Politburo, Nazarbayev continued the client-patron relations into the newly form
independent Kazakhstan that had originally allowed him to move up the ranks. Under
both past and present nomenklatura policies, client-patron relations not only allowed for
career advancement of up and coming party members, but also enforced widespread
support of the patron’s policies. The newly formed state bureaucracy transitioned into the
role of the nomenklatura which surrounded itself around Nazarbayev and his political
party. For example, in 1990, all parliamentary deputies appointed were on these
nomenklatura lists (Olcott 2010). Emrich-Bakenova (2009) describes how recent civil
service reforms introduced by President Nazarbayev promoting rational-legal authority
have actually strengthened patronage and increase partisan politization.
Persistence of spoil systems, “open” and “partisan” politization through all
the years of civil service development is not surprising, given the limited
capacity of the law to regulate practice, thus allowing managers essentially
to choose their own personnel. The new proposed model of elite corps of
civil service, and the notion that it is a norm for a lower ranking
administrative civil servant to aspire to be a politician, is an indication that
indeed the political and administrative worlds are essentially
indistinguishable (2009: 739-740).
Furthermore, the nomenklatura became an apparatus for promoting national interests
throughout Kazakh society.
The connection to its Soviet past also influences the level of seen among Kazakh
citizens. The total imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches
directly shapes the nature and the extent of representation within a parliamentary body,
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specifically in regard to female political representation. In some respects, Nazarbayev
and subsequent institutions felt the need to break from the Soviet past in order to promote
a unified Kazakh nation. As a result of this, where women were once included (even if
only symbolically), they were immediately pushed to the periphery and eliminated from
the conversation. Compounding this break with the Soviet past is the exclusion of certain
sects of the population once granted “equality.” This has led to the formation of informal
institutions and the development of civil society as excluded groups seek to gain some
level of representation, even if it is not formally accorded by governmental institutions.
Where the Communist Party once held claim over political discourse, now civic
organizations seek to fill the vacuum left in the aftermath.
How the Past Shapes Female Political Representation Today
This section seeks to accomplish two tasks. First, it attempts to link variables
highlighted under historical institutionalism with patterns of female representation in
Kazakhstan witnessed under both Soviet rule and since independence. Employing two out
of four dimensions of representation developed by Hanna Pitkin’s (1967), I argue that
historical institutionalism does provide some explanatory power for understanding the
transformation of female representation in Kazakhstan in regard to formal, descriptive,
and symbolic representation. To support this argument, I utilize interviews I conducted
with elite women and students in Almaty, Kazakhstan from August 2013 to September
2013. Before discussing Hanna Pitkin’s dimensions of representation, I provide a detailed
synopsis of those women and organizations interviewed. It is important to clarify that
these interviews were limited to a very small sample; as a result they only provide a brief
glimpse at the current status of women who lack access to governmental institutions. This
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should be an indication of overall feelings of disenfranchisement among women in
Kazakhstan. Table 4.1 demonstrates the overall findings on what ways or how
Kazakhstan has broken from its Soviet legacy.
Table 4.1 Representation in the Soviet Union and in Kazakhstan

Representation
Formal

Soviet Union
Gender Quotas
Party-State
System
Zhenotdel
Russification

-

High levels of
representation
(30%)
Low Level
Positions

-

-

Equal under Law
Healthcare
Employment
Childcare

-

-

Soviet Woman

-

-

Descriptive

-

Substantive

Symbolic

Kazakhstan

-

-

-

Removal of
Mechanisms
“Hidden” Party
State System
Kazakhization
Civil Society
Rarely hitting
15% until 2006
Familial Ties to
Party Leaders
Equal Under Law
Lack of
implementation
Increased
discrimination
Nazarbayev as
“Father”

Having secured an affiliation with KIMEP University, I focused on interviewing
three distinct groups: gender experts and academics, staff members of international and
local NGOs, and a “focus” group of four students (two female and two male) majoring in
international affairs and political science at KIMEP University. Unfortunately, my access
to political leaders was restricted, especially to members of Parliament leaders, because
of the government’s suspicion of foreigners and the limited amount of time I was
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permitted to remain in country. My research depended on the “snow ball effect,” i.e., one
interviewee introducing the researcher to potential organization/individual (Van Meter
1990). One consequence of this method is that important members of the target
population might have been excluded from the sample, such as working women, rural
women, etc., skewing the overall generalizability of my results. Therefore, I must
acknowledge the probability that issues or factors influencing female representation may
be limited to those within my sample.
In regard to their characteristics and affiliations, I interviewed members of four
NGOs ranging from local to international in their structures and missions. These
organizations included the SOROS Foundation/Open Society Foundations; the Eurasian
Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA), and the Women’s League with Creative Initiative.
Although the Center for Gender Studies is registered as an NGO in Kazakhstan, its
mission and purpose align it more with those of an expert group. The fourth organization,
focusing women’s entrepreneurship in Almaty, requested anonymity. I have labeled this
organization Women’s Entrepreneurship (WE) and removed all identifying
characteristics, as requested by the staff. The WE director did, however, allow me to cite
her as an anonymous source for the purpose of this investigation. Below, I categorize
each organization by its name, year founded, location focus, and policy domain.
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Table 4.2 Non-Governmental Organizations
Organization

Year Founded

Location Focus

Policy Domain

SOROS
Foundation

1979

International

Human Rights

Eurasian
Foundation of
Central Asia

2004

Regional

Economic
Development,
Democracy
Building, Human
Rights
Human Rights,
Gender, Family

Women’s League 2011
for Creative
Initiative

Country

*Women’s
Entrepreneurship

Local

2007

Women’s
Economic
Development

The SOROS Foundation and the EFCA do not focus solely on women’s political
participation or women-specific policies, but encompass human rights that also include
women as their target audience. The SOROS Foundation focuses on “build[ing] vibrant
and tolerant societies whose governments are accountable and open to the participation of
all people” (Open Society 2014). This implicitly includes female representation, and it
therefore was deemed appropriate to include in this sample. The “Eurasian Foundation of
Central Asia’s mission is to mobilize public and private resources to help citizens
participate in building their future by strengthening their communities and improving
their civic and economic wellbeing” (EFCA 2014). Although the organization does not
name women’s advocacy as one of its policy domains, several of its projects focus solely
on women’s issues. One such project is the “Equal before the Law” program which
provides legal consultation to vulnerable groups, including women. The other
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organizations focus solely on the promotion of women’s activism either within Central
Asia or locally in Kazakhstan.
The next subgroup of interviews involves one gender expert from the Center for
Gender Studies and political science/international relations professors at KIMEP
University in Almaty. Within the department I interviewed five faculty members but
focused on the three female professors. These interviews lasted for periods of thirty to
ninety minutes. While each professor’s focus varies across discipline, all are considered
experts on the historical and current institutional dynamics is Kazakhstan. In Table 4.3, I
list the names of the individuals interviewed, their nationality, and organizational
affiliation.
Table 4.3 Female Interviewees
Name

Nationality

Organization

Gulnara Dadabayeva

Kazakh

KIMEP University

Aigul Adibayeva

Kazakh, Tartar, Korean

KIMEP University

Svetlana Shakirova

Russian

Center for Gender Studies

Janel Bayastanova

Kazakh

Eurasian Foundation of
Central Asia

Jessica Howard

American

Eurasian Foundation of
Central Asia

Assiya Khairulllina

Kazakh

Women’s Leadership for
Creative Initiative

*Women’s
Entrepreneurship

Russian

*Women’s
Entrepreneurship
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The final group serves as an example of the positive influence of the snowball
effect. Under the direction of one of Professor Gulnara Dadabayeva, I conducted a small
focus group, comprised of two female and two male students from her international
politics course. These students may bias the results because not only did they volunteer,
suggesting they are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics;
but they are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics; but they
are more likely to hold strong opinions on the role of women in politics; but these
students also represents the views of potential future decision makers in Kazakhstan.
It is also important to acknowledge the inherent bias of interviewing female NGO
staffers. These women are an extension of political elites and are employed by NGOs that
have more of international flavor. Furthermore, these women are in a position to reflect
the ideas of their given NGOs, potentially distorting the overall picture of women in
Kazakhstan. However, these interviews still are valuable tools to gain additional insight
on women’s access to political institutions.
Returning to the connection between historical institutionalism and representation
theory, I re-introduce Hanna Pitkin’s four forms of representation: formal, descriptive,
substantive, and symbolic. I reiterate that although these types of representation are
analytically separate each, “bleeds” into the other, often causing some academics
confusion when it comes to depicting which type of representation is lacking or present.
Formal representation refers to the rules, norms, and procedures present in determining
how representative are selected. Formal representation can include forms of political
institutions, nomination processes, candidate selection, or voting systems. Descriptive
representation revolves around the numeric representation of “compositional similarity
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between representatives and the represented” (Pitkin 1967:10-11). Descriptive
representation is all about numbers and the proportion of certain populations achieving
political representation within governmental institutions.
Often seen as an extension of descriptive representation, symbolic representation
is the ability of a symbol’s power to “evoke feelings or attitude” (Pitkin 1967:97).
Symbolic representation reflects on whether the presence of the symbol affects voter or
citizen perceptions as compared to the symbol not being there. Often symbols (in this
case, the Chamber of Nationalities and presence of gender quotas) provide legitimacy to
current and past political institutions. Finally, substantive representation entails the
degree of overlap between the wishes of the represented and actions of the
representatives. Under substantive representation, citizens are not only represented
through formal procedures and numerical representation; policy formulation and
implementation actually reflect their concerns and the needs of the representatives.
Connecting historical institutionalism and certain forms of representation is not a
stretch. Historical institutionalism maintains that current institutional developments are
the result of historical patterns that the path followed or “breaks with the past” from
earlier constructions of key institutions. This includes representation. The want to
continue to break from this trajectory is only possible there was at least a minimal level
of representation. The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as the critical juncture which
shaped further patterns of representation.
This study examines the historical patterns of gender and ethnic representation
found within Kazakhstan while it was still seen as an autonomous Republic of the Soviet
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Union. It then analyzes how this historical pattern influenced the current dimensions of
female political representation in Kazakhstan. Although I am mostly looking at female
political representation, as discussed in the next chapter, I must also account for ethnic
and minority representation because many of the changes in formal, descriptive, and
symbolic representation are closely intertwined with the social construction of gender and
ethnic identity.
REPRESENTATION IN USSR
Formally, or rather legally, women in the Soviet Union were considered equal to
their male counterparts. In the formation of the USSR, it was the Bolsheviks’ aim to
emancipate women from the privacy of their homes and to exploit their paid labor in
building socialism that would eventually lead to complete equality between men and
women. Substantive policies such as banning polygamy (Rasnake et. Al 2000) and the
Red Yurt campaign, which promoted female literacy, healthcare, and vocational training
in rural Kazakhstan (Michaels 1998), were immediately adopted. The idea was to
promote the “New Soviet Woman,” as compared to the uncivilized, uneducated “baba”
(backward woman). Women were guaranteed employment, healthcare, childcare,
maternity leave that would solidify their place within the work force (LoBue 2007).
The Soviets mandated gender quotas and the creation of the Zhenotdel (the
Women’s Department of the Central Communist Secretariat) in 1919, along with their
regional version (zhenotdely). Among the working class and peasantry, women developed
political consciousness that merged into political participation within the Communist
Party. However, even with formal representation and increased descriptive representation
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promising them certain substantive and “inalienable” rights such as healthcare,
employment, education, etc., the new Soviet Woman as an equal to her male practice,
they became totally dependent on the male dominated state to protect their equality.
Gulnara Dadabeyeva,i Professor at KIMEP University, holds that although women have
more “freedom” under the current regime, women had more “rights” allotted to them
during the Soviet times in the form of childcare and maternity leave. Single mothers were
given resources to survive.
Although women were considered equal, they still received less pay for the same
or similar jobs. Women had access to employment, but their employment opportunities
were limited to lower ranking positions. Women were also dissuaded from pursuing
technical specialties while receiving an education because these positions were seen as
“male” positions. Finally, although women benefited politically from organizations such
as the Zhenotdel and from the adoption for gender quotas, guaranteeing a certain level of
political representation; women were still not part of the major decision making process
(LoBue 2007). Furthermore, their “forced emancipation” created a double bind for these
women as both workers and mothers. This dichotomy stressing equality in the public
sphere but stereotypical gender roles within the home left women trapped between
modernity and tradition in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics. Women were
caught between Soviet state expectations and their traditional, patriarchal heritage.
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REPRESENTATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
Following independence, those remaining in power pursued an alternate in
forming new institutions. This alternate path adopted both features of its pre-Soviet and
Soviet past, suggesting that although superficially the Republic of Kazakhstan sought to
break from its Soviet chains, it, in fact, still adhered to a lot of the same qualities and
rules of its predecessor. This combination of “out with the old and in with the new”
negatively affected female representation. This includes implementation of
Kazakhization policies, the presence of the Soviet legacy in regards to a centralized
government controlled by one political party, and the replacement of formal mechanisms
of female representation with the creation of a civil society. Discussed in detail in
Chapter 5, the historical implementation of Russification policies that ultimately tried to
assimilate ethnic minorities (including Kazakh) under one national Russian identity and
introduction of women as equal to men precipitated the implementation of Kazakhization
policies. The Kazakhization policies served as a break from its Soviet past by
systemically advocating for the supremacy of a unified Kazakh identity and the
elimination of any symbols associated with the Soviet identity. This included the removal
of formal mechanisms or representation that had previously been guaranteed to women in
the Soviet regime. With the removal of gender quotas (both a formal mechanism and
symbolic gesture of female representation), women’s descriptive representation initially
decreased. However, Graph 4.1 illustrates that between 2006 to 2012, the percentage of
women in Parliament more than doubled.
Despite governmental constraints, there is a dramatic increase in descriptive
representation. This increase in descriptive representation is associated to the changes in
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party lists. In 2006, the Nur Otan it opened its “closed” party list features. Although the
Nur Otan has continued to table the proposal for gender quotas (IGPN 2010), it has
opened party lists to include more women as potential candidates. Yet, even with an
increase in descriptive representation, loyalty to Nazarbayev and the Nur Otan remains a
requirement of all elected officials. Yet, while women may be subjected to party control,
there may be positive long term implications associated to including more women, at
least descriptively, in the political process.
Graph 4.1 Women in Kazakhstan Parliament, 1996-2012 (Source: IPU 2014)

Beyond the percentage of women in Parliament, formal structures like the
Zhenotdel found in the Soviet Union that had served to secure women’s voice while
conforming to party norms within the national government were dissolved upon
independence. This removal of female organizations from the state apparatus highlights
the second break from their Soviet past that Kazakh elites tried to execute. Under the
Soviet regime, civil society had not existed because no “sphere of formal organization in
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society was sufficiently independent of control by the part-state regime to be selfgoverning” (Evans et al. 2006:32). Instead all political or “civic” organizations were
under the control of the party-state with no real autonomy.
However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the onset of Kazakh
independence, civic organizations began to appear in Kazakhstan and the surrounding
region. These civic organizations, predominantly in the shape of non-governmental
organizations, possessed several goals, the most important of which was to force
governments to become more accountable to its citizens and to ensure that their needs
and rights are being met and upheld. At the initial stage of Kazakhstan’s independence,
international non-governmental organizations filled the vacuum left behind by the Soviet
regime. In other words, these organizations were meant to stimulate civil society by
providing public goods and services to the community when the government failed to
meet or satisfy the needs of its citizens.
The government’s failure to provide equal representation led women to seek
representation within these organizations. With the immediate removal of formal
mechanisms upon independence and the negative memories women associated with
formal political institutions, civil society became inundated with women. Svetlana
Shakirova,ii Director of the Center for Gender Studies, argues that Kazakhstan has a
vibrant civil society with over 80 percent of all positions held by women. Yet, the
influence of civil society in a) influencing governmental change and b) ensuring some
level of representation is questionable. Assiya Khairuulinaiii paints an even bleaker
picture: “Civil Society organizations are not wealthy which is why women are more
likely to hold positions here rather than men. It is made mostly up of volunteers and there
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is no stable funding.” Thus, even though civil society organizations are meant to provide
some levels of formal and descriptive representation and equality for women, women still
remain unequal to men, dependent on them for financial security.
Some problems the NGOs face in the democratization process include reinforcing
corruption by local elites. An increased reliance on NGOs to permanently provide public
goods and services, resulting in the reduction of the public-sector responsibility triggered
a brain drain of public-sector employees to the NGO sector. Another dilemma, seen
within female civic organizations, includes the oversaturation of NGOs not only within
one country but also within a single area of expertise such as women’s issues. This
oversaturation of NGOS not only has led to competition over limited funds but also to a
serious lack of coordination among organizations, and a “muddying” over the overall
democratization process.
Women’s needs organizations are the only apparent movement working to ensure
that some level formal and substantive representation is taking place (LoBue 2007).
However, these organizations are characterizes as signifying an “opportunity constrained
by reality” (Gottlick 1999). Although NGO staffs are dominated by females, NGOs
focusing on women’s issues only constitute 13% of all registered organizations within
Kazakhstan. However, many of these organizations are non-functioning or, worse,
contradicting the very goals they seek to attain, such as reduction in bride-knapping and
domestic violence.
One requirement of civil society is that it remains autonomous, separate from
governmental influence. Although civic organizations can work with governmental
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institutions to accomplish their goals, autonomy of these organizations must be
guaranteed. In discussing female non-governmental organizations, Aigul Adibayevaiv
explains that there is a gap between NGOS and their political goals: “NGOs are not
effective and those that are, are usually part of government sponsored initiatives which
are counter intuitive to NGOs. Thus they [NGOs] become dependent on government aid
rather than remain independent and become more pro-government, especially if a new
law is introduced. However, NGOs in Kazakhstan are not effective in promoting
democratic value. They try hard, but the environment is not conducive.” In other words,
NGOs are constraint by the government, limiting their overall effectiveness and ability to
exist.
The members of the SOROS Foundation further highlight this lack of voice
among NGOs. Identified as GONGAs (Governmental-Non-Governmental Associations),
these organizations portray themselves as “non-governmental” organizations yet depend
on state support for their survival. However, by co-opting with the government to
maintain funding, these organizations are required to follow the party line and have no
real voice. “If you get money, you either have to be neutral or follow the political line.”v
This cooperation could potentially reduce the trust of average citizens in their activities.
Out of the non-governmental organization staff interviewed, three NGOs were
independent of government funding, while the other two received some state backing.
The League with Creative Initiative receives limited funding and in-kind services lime
administrative and technical support. It is an established organization with over 25
volunteers who focuses on women’s issues such as domestic violence and brideknapping. The Women’s Entrepreneurship organization has only two staff members, and
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focuses on providing middle class women the tools for opening businesses within their
homes to provide financial support to their family while maintaining their traditional
roles within the household.
Compared to the three other organizations, these two organizations were hesitant
to say anything about whether they felt that receiving governmental aid reduced their
overall legitimacy within civil society sector. The Women’s Entrepreneurship is highly
dependent on governmental assistance which has provided commercials, direct mailings,
and bill boards to promote its agenda. The Women’s League with Creative Initiative
often works in connection with the government to present programs on the reduction of
bride-knapping and related women’s issued. Although these organizations provide
services to women not provided by the state, these organizations would not directly
assess current government dynamics and its leadership. Instead, they focused on social
issues such as domestic violence.
However, my discussion partners at the SOROS Foundation and the Center of
Gender Studies were quick to criticize both institutional structures and those nongovernmental organizations that had been co-opted. One example cited by Svetlana
Shakirova is the Women’s Business Association in Kazakhstan (WBA). Considered the
strongest among the female-needs organizations, whose sole mission is the advancement
of women, the WBA aligned itself with the Nur Otan political party because it receives
in-kind support, blurring the lines between civil society and the state.
However, GONGAs are becoming the norm among civic organizations in
Kazakhstan, especially since officials have introduced legislation banning foreign aid
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organizations from donating to local NGOs. If passed, this would eliminate a majority of
international NGOS like the SOROS Foundation, USAID, and the UNDP. It would
moreover render most local NGOs directly dependent on the government. Furthermore,
even with Nazarbayev’s claim to promote the advancement of women, Section 4 of
Article 5 of the Kazakhstan Constitution calls for the abolition of any public association
that engages in “incitement of social, racial, national, religions, or tribal discords,
collectively cutting NGOs off at their knees. This leads to the question whether
Kazakhstan has truly broken from its past, or if it is reverting back to its old Soviet ways
by eliminating core prerequisites for democratization and the need for a functioning civil
society. By co-opting non-governmental organizations, these organizations serve more as
conductors of the party line than promoters of institutional change. However, under the
Soviet regime, women at least were guaranteed some level of representation.
Conclusion: Historical Institutionalism and Female Representation
This chapter sought to determine how past developments and institutional
continue dynamics to shape current institutional structures in regards to female
representation. Through the lens of historical institutionalism, I find that Kazakhstan has
had difficulty fully breaking from its Soviet legacy and that it exhibits contradictory
behavior, both eliminating formal Soviet mechanisms like gender quotas yet allowing the
creation of informal institutions like non-governmental organizations to operate in
Kazakh society under the constraints of authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the constraints
have negatively affected female representation not only by eliminating formal
mechanisms and reducing their levels of descriptive representation buy also by limiting
the outlets women can informally represent their issues. However, as Graph 4.1 indicates,
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legislative changes have increased the number of women in parliament and that may
change further dimensions of representation in the future.
Although historical institutionalism provides a framework for understanding how
certain factors have limited female representation, HI often ignores where preferences
originate and the relationship between ideas and institutions. Historical institutionalism
often depicts actors as hostage to structures and ignores the environment and interaction
between individuals or groups that caused these structures to develop. Yet, some changes
have occurred within this aspect of governmental institutions. In order to fully appreciate
female representation in Kazakhstan, we also must understand how women are situated
within this culture. Furthermore, due to the complex ethnic relationship between Russians
and Kazakhs, we must also understand how the interaction between these groups
developed governmental structures and their effect on female representation. The next
chapter operationalizes social constructivism in hopes of developing complete
understanding as to circumstances have reduced female representation in Kazakhstan.
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Chapter Five:
Social Constructivism: The Role of Identity in Kazakhstan
Introduction
As stated throughout, this investigation seeks to bridge the gap between historical
institutionalism and social constructivism by coupling both with the four modes of
representation shaping female political participation in Kazakhstan. As the last chapter
demonstrated, historical institutionalism serves as a useful framework for understanding a
country’s structural and political development over time, and the ways in which a
country’s efforts to break from its “path” leads to certain results regarding women’s
access to governmental institutions, as well as to certain responses to a real or perceived
lack of access. However, historical institutionalism does not fully take into consideration
the role of cultural norms in the development of government institutions. Social
constructivism fills this void accounting for the causal role of “ideas” in formulating
institutional development, specifically in regard to gender representation. In this case,
social constructivism helps resolve the question as to why certain sectors of Kazakh
society (ethnic Kazakh men) are granted full representation compared to others, and
whether or not those population groups granted some level of representation feel
adequately represented, for examples, among women.
This chapter begins by briefly re-introducing the readers to social constructivism
and its relationship to gender and ethnicity. It then examines how old and new cultural
norms within Soviet society influenced policy adoption in regard to gender and ethnicity.
The fourth section then applies social constructivism to Soviet “Russification” policies,
which I then link to Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) dimensions of representation. In the fifth
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section, I reflect on the ways in which ideas and efforts to forge a new national identity
shaped who is allowed representation in Kazakhstan after independence was realized in
1991. In this section, I not only consider Kazakhization policies as they pertain to formal
and descriptive representation but also utilize interviews with elite Kazakh and Russian
women and university students. This helps to pinpoint not only the type of representation
women enjoy (or lack thereof) in Kazakhstan and, more importantly, how women feel
about the level and types of representation. These interviews offer a snapshot of female
political representation. Due to the authoritarian nature of the Kazakhstani government
and politics, compiled with native suspicion towards foreigners, there is no real way to
know how representative these interviewees are of the larger population. However, it is a
start. The final section concludes by summarizing how social constructivism allows for a
deeper understanding of the dynamics behind female representation in Kazakhstan, and it
begins to bridge the theoretical gap between historical institutionalism and social
constructivism in regard to representation politics.
Social Constructivism: Have and Have Not
At the heart of social constructivism lies the argument that ideas concerning
identity and interactions with others, and not material forces per se, influence institutional
dynamics. Based less on essentialism, which argues that group characteristics are fixed
(not accounting for in-group variance), social constructivism follows the relationship
between ways in which an individual sees herself within a community and whether the
community, in turn sees and treats the individual as a full member.
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Especially important for this study is the construction of national identity as it
pertains to ethnic, gender, and religious subgroups in Kazakhstan. Karen Cerulo
(1997:90) explains how the construction of national identities provides insights into
“ways in which actors, particularly elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities
of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies.” She argues further that “public
policymakers typically socially construct target populations in positive and negative
terms and distribute benefits and burdens so as to reflect and perpetuate these
constructions” (Ingram, et al 2007:90). Individuals and groups are considered insiders or
outsiders and the rights afforded to both groups result from changing dynamics.
Soviet Legacy and the “National Question”
One of Stalin’s most quoted phrases in regard to ethnic nationalities in the Soviet
Union was the idea of the “proletariat [Soviet] in content, national in form.” Stalin
understood that the way to converge and fuse the 150 ethnic groups within the Soviet
Union would be through appeasing minority groups that strove to remain separate from
the Soviet Union. This convergence would eventually lead to a Soviet identity under one
common “proletariat” language.
Initially, “proletariat in content, national in form” allowed active participation and
leadership by individual nationalities as long as they conformed to the Communist
Socialist project. In other words, these ethnic groups were allowed to remain semiautonomous and to maintain their cultural heritage as long as these behaviors conformed
to the Communist Party’s social and economic policies. Eventually, maintaining cultural
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identity under the parameters set by the Communist Party inherently would weaken this
traditional identity, leading to a one unified “Soviet” nationality.
Stalin, who equated national identity with languages, proposed a three-step
process for the eventual national unification. First, formerly oppressed languages would
be allowed to flourish, creating a multicultural society constrained only by party policy.
Second came the introduction of a common language for managing economic and
political structures. In other words, Russian became the dominant language in all public
and economic institutions. The third and final step involved the adoption of a one
universal language. As a result of this process, nationality differences would die away,
and leaving in their place a common language used by all (Grenoble 2003). Instead of
allowing this process to occur naturally, assimilation (Russification) policies were
adopted not only to hasten the construction of this national identity but to further promote
the Russian identity as superseding all others.
Representation: Russification Policies and the “Woman”
In her pivotal book, Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Powers: Bhavna Dave
(2007) draws a connection between previous Russification and current Kazakhization
policies. Under Russification, the Soviets believed that no nation can be great with the
loss of its language (Zanca 2010). Russification was the formal and informal policy
adopted to convert those claiming a non-ethnic Russian identity into a Russian one. As
stated earlier, Stalin believed that national identity and language were interconnected.
Although language requirements had been introduced under the Tsarist regime at the turn
of the 20th century, it was not until the “Purges” of the 1930’s that Russification policies
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gained popularity among the Communist Party officials because Stalin used the Purges to
pack the party with those completely loyal to himself. Russification policies were seen as
a quick way to change one’s ethnic non-Russian identity to a Russian one.
Theodore Weeks (2010) breaks down Russification policies into three categories:
“Administrative Russification,” “Cultural Russification” and “Sovietization.”
Administrative Russification refers to the increasing centralization seen within and
among political institutions. In the Soviet Union, party members were allowed to partake
in discussion, but once a decision was made at the higher levels it had to be followed
without question. Cultural Russification was the policy for assimilating non-ethnics.
Finally, Sovietization encompassed both administrative and cultural Russification
because Sovietization was a form of modernization drawing on industrialization,
urbanization, increased state intervention, adoption of universal education, and the
establishment of a welfare state. This process served as a tool for encouraging nonethnics to assimilate by promising them economic and political success through the
creation of a Soviet identity. This “new” Soviet Union would be educated, scientific, and
speak fluent Russian. Furthermore, assimilation demanded that women be treated as
equals in the quest to build a socialist society.
The fictional construction of the “New Soviet Union” featured an educated and
independent woman, free from domestic concerns to take her role in the paid labor force.
Replacing the “baba” (backward) woman associated with rural Russians and ethnic
minorities meant that in her place would stand a proud, loyal worker ready to promote a
unified Soviet identity. Yet construction of this fictional identity was not without
criticism.
75

Image 5.1 The Worker and the Collective Farm Woman

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica 2014

The Worker and the Collective Farm Woman monument created by Vera
Mukhina in 1937 serves as the epitome of the ideal behind the construction of the “New
Soviet Woman.” On the surface, the woman is standing equal to her male counterpart,
holding up the sickle symbolizing the peasants, while the man holds up the hammer,
referencing the workers or proletariat. However, this symbol of equality also depicts the
inequality still present within the Soviet political structure as discussed in Chapter Four.
The symbols of the two lower classes are still gendered with women as subservient. The
proletariat is represented by the male and the peasantry by the female, inherently
promoting gender inequality.
Women were faced with a double bind. They were encouraged to enter the paid
labor force and maintain the superficial appearance of equality to men, but they also had
to return home and take their place as wives and mothers. Even with the entrance into the
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paid labor force in lower ranking positions with lower wages, women remained
dependent not just on men, but also on the masculine institution of the state.
Kazakhization and Backlash to the Soviet Past: Pitkin’s Representation and Gender
Politics
When the Soviet republics gained independence following the collapse of the
USSR in 1991, a resurgence of identity politics, an increasing emphasis on ethnicity,
pushed women out of governmental institutions.
…Two particular outcomes of the Soviet legacy of gender equality impact
and the development initiatives in important ways: decline of women’s
status after Kazakhstan’s independence and an overvaluation of gender
equality in the Soviet Union (LoBue 2007:24)
Following Kazakhstan’s declaration of independence, rights that had been
afforded women based solely on their identity as women disappeared. Healthcare,
economic status, quotas, etc., all rights to which women had become accustomed were
lost to the rise of nationalism and the changing status of citizenship in Kazakhstan.
Constituting a form of backlash to decades of Russification programs, newly independent
Kazakh elites began institutionalizing “Kazakhization” policies. This is the “process of
the ascendance of Kazakhs as a national group at the expense of other national groups,
mainly Russians” (Matuszkiewicz 2010). Michel Huysseune (2006:2) argues that this
“emergence of cultural and ethnic minorities is to be understood as a reaction against
policies of cultural homogenization of nation-stated.” In other words, the nationalism that
took root and is intensifying in Kazakhstan does not come as a surprise because
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nationalism most likely occurs in previously occupied or colonized states in which the
citizens were forced to assimilate to the dominant or controlling cultures.
In the Concepts of National Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Up to 2015, the
government explicitly identifies several central areas in which it seeks to institutionalize
Kazakh as not only as a superior ethnicity but to define being Kazakh as both an ethnicity
and nationality. This document explicitly prioritizes the values of the Kazakh people as
compared to other nationalities. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is to be regarded as monoethnic state. To encourage this paradigm, there is to be a limit on foreign television
channels and the Kazakh language will eventually shift from its Soviet-style Cyrillic
script to a Latin Script (Shakirova 2012) which curiously has no tie to ancient Kazakh
culture.
The main thrust of Kazakhization policies takes the form of language
requirements. Kazakh remains the official state language and, as a result, many state and
public positions, not limited to elected positions, require fluent knowledge of the state
language (Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 23). Because of this
requirement, the number of Kazakh-language schools has increased, just as the number of
Russian-language schools has decreased. The evaluation of the Kazakh language is also
seen across the media landscape where quotas exist for the number of Kazakh-language
broadcast (Law of the Languages of Kazakhstan, July 11, 1997, No.151-1).
As a result of this “swapping” of state languages, there has been a rise in national
consciousness among the Kazakh people, leading to an increase in the proportion of
Kazakhs occupying the public sphere. However, the negative consequences perhaps
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outweigh the positive revival of ethnic nationalism. In other words, these policies have
come at a great cost to those are not Kazakh men. With regard to Pitkin’s forms of
representation, Kazakhization policies implemented based on this very limited
construction of identity, has led to substantial shift in citizenship rights. The resurgence
of ethno-nationalism and the implementation of Kazakhization policies has perpetuated
and intensified male superiority and the power of Kazakh men, at the expense of their
female and Russian counterparts.
The shift in political systems from a communist regime to a “developing
democracy” with strong authoritarian components has flipped the definition of who is
considered an insider, outsider, who winds up somewhere in between. Returning to
Pitkin, the formal transformation of the definition of representation included the much
discussed language requirements and its effect on citizenship requirements. National law
now limits not only who has access to public officer but also to all levels and types of
employment in the Kazakhstani government. One result was the mass emigration of
Russians from Kazakhstan. According to the 1988 census, Kazakhs comprised of 39.7
percent of the population while Russians were 37.8 percent. By 2011, the Kazakh
population had increased to 63.1 percent, compared to 23.7 percent among Russians. The
requirement that all public-sector employees speak fluent Kazakhs means that only five
percent of these positions are currently held by non-Kazakhs (Panfilova 2014). This
paints an overall picture of disparity between Kazakhs and non-ethnic Kazakhs solely on
the basis of ethnicity and nationality.
Women have also felt the backlash of the rise in ethnic nationalism in
Kazakhstan. The first, most visible indicator of the reconstruction of a dominant male
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identity has been the removal of gender quotas from the national Parliament. Seen as a
symbol of Soviet imperialism, gender quotas were eliminated upon independence leading
to a decrease in the percentage of women in both the Senate and the Majilis. Prior to the
Soviet collapse, 30 percent of all seats in parliament had been for women in the KSSR.
Until 2012, women had rarely occupied more than three percent of the Senate seats and
17 percent of all seats in the Majilis (IPU 2014). The removal of formal mechanisms
meant to include women into the decision making process also led to a decline in
substantive policies that were adopted and implemented to increase female political
participation.
Under the Soviet regime, women had been guaranteed education, divorce and
property rights, they had enjoyed relatively high levels of literacy and were afforded paid
maternity leave and childcare. After independence, women’s status as equal partners was
displaced by the symbol of a unified, ethnic male named Nursultan Nazarbayev. One
result of the elimination of Russian social policies was the reduction of state
responsibility for social services which directly erodes the status of women. Janel
Bayastanovavi of the Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia contends that the
decentralization led to “local mayors hav[ing] no budget for women’s concerns because
of the corruption and the trickle-down effect it causes.” As result, gender discrimination
indirectly increased. For example, in 1988, women earned only 75.8 percent of men’s
salaries. In 2001, this reduced to 58.4 percent (LoBue 2007:88). There are no law suits
against wage discrimination. According to Assiya Khairuulina,vii League of Creative
Initiative, “Laws aren’t working to protect. They are not developed and in detail. Equality
here is defined broadly.”
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Across the board, the women I interviewed believed that gender issues are not
being addressed by the government in Kazakhstan. During my interviews with 14 female
academics and NGO members, three main policy concerns arose: retirement age, brideknapping, and violence against women.
On June 21, 2013, President Nazarbayev signed pension reform that would raise
women’s retirement from 58 to 63 (Volshin 2013). The logic of this change is that it
would align female and male pension age (thus offering “equality” for all); women are
still losers in this case because they are less likely to be hired or retained than their male
counterparts past the age of 58, thus increasing unemployment and reducing their
eventual pension benefits. Although women constitute nearly 70 percent of those
receiving a pension in Kazakhstan, their pensions, on average are 30 percent less than
those of males due to lower salaries and unpaid maternity leave (LoBue 2007). This
creates a double bind: women receive lower wages and have a harder time remaining
employed after a certain age, thereby increasing their dependency on husbands and male
family members for survival.
Aigul Adibayevaviii, Professor at KIMEP University, highlighted this policy’s
negative impact on women in Kazakhstan.
For example: the increase in retirement age. It is anti-woman on how it
affects poorer women, invalid women who find it impossible to work at
that age. Also, before the law was implemented, women always found jobs
and were unofficially forced to retirement when they reached a certain
age. Now there is a labor problem because young can’t find jobs and now

81

can’t retire forcing a double bind. The indirect effect of this is that women
are becoming very dependent on husbands and families.
The member of the Women’s Entrepreneurshipix supports the claim that women are
disadvantaged by this policy adoption because “no one wants to hire elderly women.”
Substantively, laws against domestic violence and bride-knapping also have been
lacking. According to the Law on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (2010), men
and women are equal, in theory. But in practice another story emerges. Assiya
Khairuulina (Women’s League with Creative Initiative), reported that seven to ten
percent of marriages in Kazakhstan are forced marriages (bride-knapping) were women
are pushed into marriage between the ages of 14 to 18 by their captors.x
Cynthia Werner discussed why bride-knapping has gone relatively unchecked in
Kazakhstan under post-Soviet institutions and laws:
The rise of non-consensual bride-knapping relates to the changing nature
of state-society relations in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. In
particular, this trend is attributed to the transition from a socialist statewhere women’s rights were protected and economic security was provided
– to a post socialist state where the following three factors are present: (1)
Popular support for and state promotion of Kazakh nationalism has
encouraged the restoration of “traditional” gender roles. (2) an increasing
perception that the legal system is corrupt has ensure that young men are
confident that they can get away with this crime (2013).
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This return to cultural traditions and the return of the traditional roles of men as
the heads of households have also increased the levels of domestic violence. Svetlana
Shakirovaxi observes that although there are laws on the books, implementation has had
many problems. “There is no good mechanism to make a safe environment. Most
property is owned by men because they have the resources’ so the police and the courts
see him as the property owner. The Original Criminal Code which outlines rights
afforded to victims of domestic violence remains inadequate.
First, only since 2006 have authorities reported consistent statistics on the levels
of domestic violence in Kazakhstan (Stop Violence Against Women 2010). In 2005, 71
percent of women reported being a victim of domestic violence at some point in their
lives. Out of 71 percent, only 26 percent reported to a crisis center (LoBue 2007). In
2006, out of 10,000 domestic violence reports filed with the police, only 4,700 of these
resulted in penalties in the form of monetary fines (Stop Violence Against Women 2010).
The problem lies within the belief that the private sphere where domestic violence occurs
is seen as a family matter. One female university studentxii reported that it was
commonplace for her father to beat her and that she had had no recourse against these
beatings.
Not only are men not accorded criminal punishment for their abuses, but the sham
of monetary fines leaves women at risk for future attacks, since the abuser remains in the
home. The victim often remains dependent on her male attacker for financial survival. In
2006, there were twenty-two NGOs that addressed domestic violence, but only four of
those twenty-two offered any form of shelter for women from their attackers (Stop
Violence Against Women 2010).
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Jessica Howardxiii of the Eurasian Foundation of Central Asia further expounds:
“Many people, even in the NGO world, simply don’t recognize that there gender-related
issues in Kazakhstan. More than once I’ve tried to initiate a gender-focused project only
to have my own colleagues tell me that there’s no reason here, because there aren’t any
problems…”
These cultural constructions of women as subservient to male family members
also translated women not entering the public sphere and running for political office after
independence in 1991. Symbolic representation intertwines with descriptive
representation in identifying the type of women elected to political office. The next
question is whether or not female citizens feel represented by these women politicians.
With the initial decrease in women holding political office, from the earlier mandates
30% to barely 14 percent from 1991 to 2006, only women with influential male family
members were elected to political office. The most notable female official with familial
ties is Dariga Nazarbayeva, daughter of President Nazarbayev. She serves as both the
deputy speaker of the Majilis and as deputy director of the Nur Otan political party
(Gizitdinov 2014).
Professor Aigul Adibayevaxiv of KIMEP University argues that although Dariga
Nazarbayeva sometimes promotes women’s issues, gender interests are rarely pushed
because they lack profitability (financial backing) associated with women’s issues. In
other words, there is no strategic purpose for politicians to pursue women’s issues.
Shakirovaxv as well as the members of the SOROS Foundationxvi agree that those women
who are elected serve as pawns to the Nur Otan. Even when female officials cherry-pick
women and children’s issues to address, these women have no real voice. Having to toe
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the party line, the lack of voice and inability to promote women’s issues as women see fit
may lead to many to characterize women in Parliament as lacking legitimacy.
A majority of the women interviewed described females elected to political office
as the wives, lovers, and daughters of prominent men within Kazakh society. The director
of the Women’s Entrepreneurship organization refused to comment on women elected to
political office, probably because her organization receives the majority of its funding
from the state. Adibayevaxvii provided the example of the large number of female
television reporters who were once mistresses to prominent male officials; they
subsequently gained access to the political arena through this connection. Yet, Assiya
Khairuulinaxviii contends that any female presence in Parliament is important for symbolic
reasons: “Yes, women are influential, but will follow party lines. Women are seen as less
corrupt because they are seen as honest.” Therefore, even when women in elected
positions are seen to lack legitimacy, they are still viewed or perceived as less corrupt
than their male counterparts.
Why are only mistresses and women with familial ties running for political
office? If women feel that they are not adequately represented, why are they themselves
not running for office or pressuring the current administration to adopt formal
mechanisms to increase female representation? First, many women reject quotas because
the symbol of the quota is associated with the Soviet Union. Secondly, politics itself is
seen as a male domain and associated with corruption (Einhorn 1993; Siklova 1997;
Snitow 1998). Thirdly, cultural norms pressure women from entering the public sphere.
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It is important to remember the dichotomy between the idealized “Soviet
Woman” and the “new” Kazakh national identity. One of the key departures from
Kazakhstan’s past with the Soviet Union was the deliberate return to traditional norms
and cultural values. Although the last chapter discussed the removal of formal
mechanisms promoting gender equality, leading women to resort to informal conduits
such as non-governmental organizations, the state’s desire to reinstate cultural and
traditional norms also restructured gender roles within Kazakhstan.
LoBue (2007) suggests that there are three ways in which a woman can gain
access to the political arena in Kazakhstan: a) by securing support from the Nur Otan, b)
by way of presidential appointment or by c) running independently. However, a woman
receiving a presidential appointment would indicate automatic support from and for the
Nur Otan, because the president is the head of the only functioning political party.
Furthermore, given the limited resources allotted to women and their increased
dependence on male partners, the likelihood of women gaining access without the
support from men is minimal.
During one interview, Adibayeva described how one female friend unsuccessfully
campaigned for political office. Due to her lack of personal income, she was forced to
borrow money from her husband in order to finance her campaign. Because she did not
secure a political position with her husband’s resources, she was ultimately shamed by
her community because she lost while using her husband’s money. This highlights the
underlying belief that the political arena should be male dominated.
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A further reconstruction of gender roles is seen in the return to the ideal of women
as mothers and as the property of the home. The Women’s Entrepreneurship memberxix
argued that women tend not to run for political office because they are distancing
themselves from the government in favor of focusing on their families. This notion of
family and the home as one of the few parameters allotted to women was reinforced by
comments from two male studentsxx(one ethnically Kazakh and the other Arab,
respectively). Both indicated that the role of a woman was to first be a good wife and
mother. Although the Kazakh male student was comfortable in allowing his wife to
pursue employment as long as the family structure did not suffer, the male Arab student
contended that women could pursue employment before having children, but they should
remain at home once children were born. When asked if women should be allowed to run
for political office, the Arab student declared that “women aren’t good politicians
because they psychologically aren’t constructed the same as men. Men think in
perspective, they have foresight. Women only see in the present situation.”
Highlight cultural norms, Svetlana Shakirova (2012:2-3) depicts how traditional
roles unduly burden women, forcing them to remain in the household. Not only are
women expected to be good mothers, but all domestic roles that take precedence over
other activities. Going so far as to maintain separation between male and female gender
roles, many traditional Kazakh men will completely abstain from household labor.
Promotion of the complete separation of male and female roles influences women’s
interest in campaigning for political office. Gulnara Dadabayevaxxi observed that a
majority of her female students were enrolled not only to receive an education but also to
find desirable husbands. Although husbands want their wives’ responsibilities take
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precedence in the household, they also want their wives to be educated so that they may
instruct their children (LoBue 2007). As LoBue contends, women in Kazakhstan are over
educated and underemployed. I argue that women have become housewives with an
education.
The push for women to return to traditional gender roles, no long serving as
symbols of political equality in favor of a universalized Kazakh identity leads to the
question as to whether any political role models exist to make women feel as if they are
represented on at least some level. Ironically, the symbol (in this case, person) most
associated with the rise of ethnic nationalism and often seen as the opposite of democratic
reform has also served as form of stability to women by guaranteeing at least some level
of female representation. This symbol is none other than President Nazarbayev, himself.
Image 5.2 President Nursultan Nazarbayev

Source: Associated Press

Often called the Papa or the Father of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has secured his
image as the “balancer” between factions (Orange 2011), maintaining relative peace in
Kazakhstan through the use of authoritarian tactics under the guise of democratic
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representation. This father figure image provides comfort even to women who claim to
have limited rights under Nazarbayev, arguing that at least under his regime they have
some rights instead of none. Aigul Adibayevaxxii observes that “although considered a
dictator, without him at the helm, instability would have occurred and when he steps
down there is a fear that the advancements that have been made will fall to the waste side.
Furthermore, “Nazarbayev is seen as very pragmatic and promotes neutral policies. There
is a fear of if he leaves, traditional values will return and hurt the status of women. His
stability affects the role of women.” This indicates that even though there has been a
return to traditional values, these values have been held at bay somewhat by the presence
of Nazarbayev.
There are several reasons why Nazarbayev stands as the sole champion of
women’s rights in Kazakhstan. Beyond signing onto the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1998), in 2005, Nazarbayev ratified the
Strategy on Gender Equality in Kazakhstan for 2006-2010, promoting gender inequality
in social and political institutions (Zhantaykyzy 2013). In a 2013 speech, he stated “I
instructed the government, together with the President Administration, the National
Committee on the Family and Women, the leadership of the Nur Otan political party to
develop a concrete action plan by 2016 to promote women’s participation in the sphere of
decision-making” (Zhantaykyzy 2013:A8). However, skeptics claim that these words
have very little power until they are sanctioned as a legal act.
Female Identity Equates to Lack of Representation
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The once liberating symbol of women as equal to men dissipated in Kazakhstan
as a result of a reconstruction of Kazakh identity and nationalism, as a form of backlash
against Soviet assimilation policies. This “newly” formed identity based on a folkloric
past not only legitimized Kazakh as the supreme ethnicity and nationality in Kazakhstan,
but further subjugated women by removing many rights they had secured under the
Soviet Union.
By removing the formal and symbolic mechanism of gender quotas because of its
association with the Soviet Union, women’s numerical representation saw an initial
decrease from the time of 30 percent mandated quota. Furthermore, the return to
traditional norms, epitomized by these Kazakhization policies, also led to the increase of
formal and informal discrimination stemming from national policies. Rooted in the
changes in pension age requirements, tolerance of bride-knapping and domestic violence,
women in Kazakhstan now enjoy fewer substantive rights than their male counterparts.
Not only is there a disconnect between conventions mandating equal treatment of men
and women, laws meant to protect (See Appendix B) the well-being of women in general,
and implementation of policies, there has been a cultural shift mandating that women’s
issues should be regulated in the privacy of the homes and not within the public sphere.
As a result, domestic violence remains decriminalized and bride-knapping of young
women remains high. Furthermore, women who have been elected to political office are
not perceived as legitimate; they are there to serve at the whims of the Nur Otan. The one
person that provides at least some comfort to women and guarantees women a minimal
level of representation is President Nazarbayev. I argue that Nazarbayev as a champion of
women’s rights should remain suspect since women’s representation remains limited.
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Conclusion: Social Constructivism and Female Representation
In Kazakhstan, the reconstruction of ethnic identity inherently reversed and
positions accorded to not only ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians but also transformed
the role of women within Kazakhstani political and economic institutions. With the return
of traditional values and the paradigm shift in ethnic supremacy, governmental
institutions that allocated superficial “descriptive” equality to women in all dimensions of
representation, substantive representation in the form of policies promoting women’s
issues has been completely relegated to the sidelines in favor of more pro-ethno
nationalist policies. One consequence of this has been the reinstatement of discriminatory
policies towards women and an increase in domestic violence and occurrences of brideknapping. The construction of gender identity has moreover transformed symbolic
representation. Not only have women been cast aside as symbols of equality and
modernization, the state has this symbol with a patriarchal male, seen as the protector of
his citizens.
Social constructivism inherently privileges agency and the role of ideas over
structures. In so doing, it overlooks that material constraints can curb an individual’s
capacity to form ideas. The strength of social constructivism is that it supports the belief
that culture matters, and the ways in which constructs categories such as gender,
ethnicity, and nationality and their relationship to one another influence how structures
and norms develop. Government structures are a reflection of the institutionalization of
the interactions of these socially constructed categories.
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If social constructivism favors agency but overlooks structural constraints and
historical institutionalism limits the role of agency in order to concentrate on formal
structures, each independently lacks the overall explanatory value to fully grasp how
female representation has decreased, formally, substantively and symbolically. I was
unable to fully explore the idea of symbolic representation because of the fact I could
only interview women belonging to NGOs. Because I could not get a larger sample of
women, it is hard to assess whether their feelings of representation truly reflect the
female population. Because of this limitation, it is further difficult to conclude that social
constructivism is a good lens for exploration. Additionally, I was unable to detect the role
of religion on the political views of the women across the state. A representative sample
of women in Kazakhstan certainly might challenge the notions of the women. At this
point, these findings provide more of an insight into female representation in Kazakhstan.
The next chapter begins by returning to type of female representation in
Kazakhstan while utilizing historical institutionalism and social constructivism. It then
provides a discussion as to the ways in which these two frameworks into one can provide
a much more substantive analysis of female representation. It then addresses the
limitations and offers recommendations for future research. Finally, this study concludes
by discussing potential consequences of re-traditionalizing the roles of women in
Kazakhstan.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
Reviewing the Issue
This study hoped to accomplish two goals. First, it sought to understand what
dynamics have led to the current levels of female representation in Kazakhstan under the
frameworks of historical institutionalism and social constructivism. The second and
loftier objective was to test the effectiveness of historical institutionalism and social
constructivism in considering various dimensions of female representation. Although
each framework provides explanatory power in determining how female representation
has been transformed, each framework lacks what the other employs. Instead, to
understand current institutional dynamics and their effect on female representation fully,
historical institutionalism and social constructivism must learn to co-exist in a coevolutionary process, as discussed by Sven Steinmo (2008).
This chapter begins by first reviewing how historical institutionalism and social
constructivism individually allowed us to grasp the effect of a country’s historical legacy
and transformation of identity politics on female representation in Kazakhstan. It then
turns to a more theoretical discussion, exploring whether a co-evolutionary process
combining both constructivist and material forces in the form of path dependency and the
role of ides can produce a more nuanced account of current institutional dynamics not
only in Kazakhstan but in other “forgotten” Central Asian Republics. This final section of
this chapter provides recommendations for further research and concludes.
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Historical Institutionalism and Social Constructivism: So What about Women in
Kazakhstan?
Employing historical institutionalism and social constructivism as theoretical
frameworks in which to observe various dimensions of representation as categorized by
Hanna Pitkin (1967), while I observed that the overall female representation in
Kazakhstan is a far cry from the democratizing practices the Kazakhstani government
claims to uphold, progress has been made in the area of descriptive representation.
Despite this finding, however, women in Kazakhstan had achieved higher levels of
representation in all four dimensions: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic
while under Soviet rule than under the current regime headed by President Nursultan
Nazarbayev.
Historical institutionalism allowed for an overall analysis on how the people of
Kazakhstan face at least two critical junctures in which they might have broken the
chains of their past: the first in 1917, when Kazakhstan became an autonomous republic,
and again in 1991 when Kazakhstan declared its independence. The current path before
Kazakhstan involves a mixture of both its nomadic Kazakh heritage and the Soviet
regime from which it tried to liberate itself. In regard to traditional values that prevailed
prior to Soviet occupation, national leaders introduced Kazakhization policies after 1991
in hopes of rendering Kazakh identity supreme as compared to its subservient titular
nationality status under ethnic Russians. Presented in terms of social constructivism,
these Kazakhization policies entail a blend of both a break from path dependent behavior,
and the renewed construction of identity based solely on nationality and race.
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A further break from its Soviet past in favor of a return to patriarchal norms is
seen in the relationship between representation and women. Under the Soviet Union,
women were granted formal equality vis-à-vis their male counterparts, even if only
superficially. Formally, political institutions mandated a 30 percent quota to encourage
female political participation. This quota also ensured an increased level of descriptive
representation among women in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore,
women also had a formal political organization within the Communist Party, the
Zhenotdel, which allowed women to promote gender-friendly issues such as universal
healthcare, paid maternity leave, child care, etc. within the party framework. Women
under the Soviet regime were at least guaranteed some level of formal representation.
However, the extent of this representation was misleading. Women may have had formal
access to political institutions, but they were still seen as a subservient to men often
receiving lower pay, holding less skilled positions of the labor market, and facing
exclusion from the overall decision-making processes.
Following independence, the elites from Kazakhstan broke away from this path of
advancing female equality, essentially removing formal mechanisms that had guaranteed
at least a superficial level of representation. The elimination of gender quotas and the
dissolution of the Zhenotdel, because of its association with the Soviet Union, led to an
initially sharp decrease in the percentage of women found in Parliament. Instead of
finding security within the political structure of the Communist party, women were
forced to engage outside of the formal political arena; they began to develop new
institutions to ensure at least some form of representation.
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Another significant break from its institutional past centered on the creation of
civil society and civil associations. Under the Soviet regime, independent civic
associations had been banned; all social and political discussions had to take place within
the constraints of the Communist Party. In other words, civil society did not exist in the
Soviet Union. However, with independence, civil society began to form to help fill a
void. For women, these new civic organizations and non-governmental associations
provided all dimensions of representation outside the existing governmental institutions.
Formally, these organizations are structured as to be woman friendly; descriptively, they
are dominated by women: over 80 percent of all positions within these organizations held
by females, including the leadership positions. Substantively, these organizations often
serve as the sole arena in which women’s issues can be addressed beyond just speeches
on International Women’s Day. Finally, non-governmental organizations present
themselves as a symbol of transparency and lack of corruption, as compared to the maledominated political institutions in Kazakhstan. Yet, women are well aware that civil
society in Kazakhstan is in its relative infancy and that the forms of representation
granted to them within these “new” institutions are limited, since these organizations are
required to be respondent to formal political institutions. While women appear to have
better representation in non-governmental organizations, inroads are being made within
Parliament with the recent increase of descriptive representation.
This circles back to whether Kazakhstan has truly broke from its past or whether
these newly created institutions are simply cosmetic, covering up old scars that still
remain. One of the most obvious developments that demonstrates Kazakhstan’s inability
to break from its historical path lies with Nazarbayev and the political system itself. A
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hold-over from the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev was a party loyalist until independence at
which point he transitioned from serving as the appointed First Secretary General to a
“democratically” elected President. I would be remiss to assume that following
independence Nazarbayev would have shed his cloak of imperialism and transformed
himself into a real promoter of democratic values. Further relics of Kazakhstan’s Soviet
past are found in the interconnectedness between the dominant party Nur Otan and the
state. Although the Nur Otan does not completely parallel the state as seen in its
predecessor, the interviewing of state and the Nur Otan is very apparent. First,
Nazarbayev resides as head of both. Secondly, Constitutional amendments dictate that no
political parties are allowed to oppose the current administration. Finally, admission to
political institutions requires active support from key party gatekeepers.
There are also signs that Kazakhstan may be reverting even farther back to its
Soviet past: newly introduced legislation that if adopted would ban non-governmental
organizations from receiving foreign aid, the limiting their right to organize; the
Constitution also bans any public association “geared to forcible change in the
constitution” (Kazakhstan Constitution Section 4, Article 5). Where once civic
organizations hoped to stimulate change, civic organizations will potentially be forced to
co-opt themselves to follow the state and ultimately party lines, as seen in the Soviet
Union. Therefore, the new informal institutional roles of civil society may be diminishing
a Kazakhstan returns to its “Soviet” historical roots.
Even through historical institutionalism helps to establish clear causality as to
how Kazakhstan’s inconsistent break from the past has come at the expense of gender
representation, there are other dynamics that must be addressed to further contextualize
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what is taking place in Kazakhstan. The discord seen between female representation and
emphasis is on ethnic nationality can only be fully understood if one includes an analysis
on how the construction of identity has been transformed in Kazakhstan, leading to a
clear decline in female representation.
Under the new regime, ethnic Kazakh identity has been exalted over Russian
predominance. Under the guise of Kazakhization policies and a return to the original
cultural heritage, the ethnic Kazakh male has been reevaluated not only the decision
maker in the privacy of his home but also within the public sphere pushed ethnic
Russians to the periphery at the same time this shift has removed rights previously
accorded to women. In other words, the construction of gender and ethnicity, as well as
the norms associated with both has been reversed as well.
As discussed under historical institutionalism, reverting back to pre-Soviet
cultural norms has led to the elimination of formal mechanisms and the percentage of
women in Parliament in Kazakhstan. More importantly, the reconstruction of gender
roles has negatively affected substantive representation in Kazakhstan leading to an
increase in direct and indirect discrimination against women. According to examples
provided by the women interviewed, policies regarding women are rarely addressed
because many of the matters are seen as domestic, to be decided by the husband, not the
state. Because of this, domestic violence and the number of younger girls forced into
unwanted marriages have increased. The disparity between men and women’s economic
standing has widened considerably, causing women to rely further on their husbands for
economic survival.

98

Social constructivism allows us to acknowledge further the ways in which the
Kazakh national identity has also eliminated women as the symbol of progress and
freedom. Where women once served as the Soviet identity, epitomizing strength,
education, hard work, and equality, there now stands the picture of a patriarchal father
meant to provide stability and security to his children, including women. Furthermore,
elected women are not perceived as legitimate representatives among their female
constituents, they often symbolize a continuation of corruption and familial ties, instead
of promoting feelings of trust and expectation of representation.
Social constructivists posit that institutional arrangements are based upon how
society understands how the world works, less on material forces, and more on evolution
of ideas through interaction. The interaction between Kazakhs and Russians has
transformed history over time, leading to the development of reconstructed gender roles,
inherently removed from the advances women had made towards achieving equality
between 1917 and 1991. Institutions changed as the idea of national identity was
redefined and evolved. However, social constructivists face the problem of not explaining
how discourse rises and falls.
Historical institutionalism is often associated with materialism and that paths are
dependent on increasing returns. In other words, institutions constrain the choices that
decision makers undertake to enhance national material interests. At the same time,
institutional trajectories can be altered when a critical juncture or choice point, allowing a
different alternative, presents itself (Mahoney 2001). Critical junctures emphasize the
role of agency and the actor’s ability to shape an outcome more than normal
circumstances would permit. In this case, the critical juncture was the collapse of the
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Soviet Union. The choice left to Nazarbayev and the Kazakh elite was how to ensure that
a) they remained in power and b) that ensured the stability of Kazakhstan. Power and
stability lie at the center of their material interests. Hence, the reason that institutional
development comprised of a blend of Soviet political structures (centralized figure head
surrounded by one political) and ethnic nationalism to unite Kazakhstan under one
banner.
However, the need for an ethnic-nationalist platform would have been irrelevant
had not there been the idea of Soviet unity and identity which transformed Kazakhstan’s
social and political structures at the expense of ethnic Kazakh and minority groups for 70
years. The idea of including gender equality into this Soviet identity influenced
institutional structures to mandate gender inclusiveness. Thus the interaction of ideas of
gender inclusiveness and ethnic assimilation framed the structures not only in the Soviet
Union but also in modern day Kazakhstan. As ideas of nationality and gender change and
interactions vary, institutions change to reflect this.
Several evolutionary and constructivist institutionalists try to overcome the
deficiency often associated with historical institutionalism with the strengths of social
constructivism: the inability to fully address the relationship between ideas, preferences
and institutions (See Lewis and Steinmo 2012). Historical institutionalists argue that
structures influence preferences, but that these institutions do not answer where these
preferences or ideas come from. North (2008) expands on this evolutionary approach by
explaining how preferences evolve from humans learning from another, as seen in the
development of culture. Lewis and Steinmo (2012) further this by arguing that
institutions are the space for agent variation where new ideas and strategies form and
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thereby impact the existing institutions. Evolutionary and constructivist institutionalists
are beginning to see the process of ideational change (agency variation) and historical
change (structure) as interactive; they still have not made the leap of fully blending social
construction and historical institutionalism under one paradigm.
Although it could be argued that interaction between idea transformation (social
constructivism) and structural path dependent behavior (historical institutionalism) are
cyclical, I had hoped to argue that these cannot be separated into two dichotomous
approaches, completely independent mechanisms influencing each other. However, the
limitations of this study prevented me from fully examining this question.
Limitations and Recommendations
The most glaring limitation of this study pertains to constraints on my field
research. It is open to question whether or not I captured generally shared perceptions and
interests on whether women are really disenfranchised in regard to representation. Due to
time constraints and the suspicion towards foreigners in Kazakhstan, my interviews were
limited to a small number of elite/middle-class women and an even smaller number of
university students. By interviewing only one small segment of the female population, I
encountered issues of reliability. Although I attempted triangulation, that is to increase
the reliability of my findings by interviewing different groups of elite and middle-class
women (academics, non-governmental organizations and students), I was not able to
carry out my original research agenda, which would have included discussions with m
any more elected officials, and with rural, economically disadvantaged women. However,
I argue that the perceived lack of representation felts by these elite women inevitably
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trickles down to all women in Kazakhstan; perhaps it is even more pronounced among
poor and rural segments of the female population.
I offer three recommendations for continuing this type of research. The first
recommendation would involve increasing the sample size to include rural and working
class women. By increasing the sample size, one could conduct a more in-depth analysis
on female representation in Kazakhstan. This, of course, would require changes in
Kazakhstan visa policies, especially towards United States citizens. The next suggestion
would be to expand the study of female representation to include other Central Asian
republics. By examining female representation in nearby countries, we could determine
whether this phenomenon is unique to Kazakhstan whether it extends to other post-Soviet
republics. However, even this comparison will be difficult due to the limited availability
of data on employment, domestic violence, and other standard indicators of women’s
socio-economic status. The final suggestion for this enhanced research agenda would be
to include a mixed methodology that would combine quantitative and qualitative analysis
that would statistically test not only factors that have hindered female political
representation in all post-Soviet regimes but also provide a contextual analysis as to how
certain barriers have developed within each country and their total impact on various
forms of representation.
Conclusion
This analysis began by exploring shifts in the levels of representation in
Kazakhstan and the main factors influencing these levels. Unfortunately, female
representation as it stands currently is less significant now than under the Soviet regime.
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Although Kazakhstan claims to be in the process of “democratizing,” which should
require policies that ensure equal participation among all sectors of the society, there is
little evidence of this in Kazakhstan. Instead, Kazakhstan has engaged in contradictory
behavior: it seeks to break from its historical past by introducing new institutions to fill
the void left with the collapse of the Soviet Union, only to limit the ability of these
organizations to reach their full potential. Furthermore, the interaction between the
construction of gender and ethnic nationalism leaves few opportunities for women to
engage in political discourse or to enhance the prospects for transforming institutions in
order to gain more political equality. This leads me to wonder if women facing strong
cultural and structural barriers will ever be able to overcome gender inequality and
discrimination under the current regime. Or is socialism, as seen in the Soviet Union, the
best that these women could have hoped for gaining voice?
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APPENDIX A
Interview Questions
Name:
Date:
Location:
Age:
Position:
Years of Experience:
Religious Affiliation:
Ethnicity:
Permission: Before we start, would you mind if I quote you directly in my dissertation or
would you prefer to remain anonymous?

Part 1: Recollections of the way things “used to be
1. Based on your experiences or conversations with other women who were active
back then, what were the two or three biggest problems women used to face?
2. What were the two or three rights that you think women appreciated under the old
system?
3. Prior to independence, did you or any women close to you hold political
positions? If so, which ones?

Part 2: Changes in women’s problems and rights since 1991
1. What do you think the 2 or 3 biggest problems facing women now?
2. Are there different problems confronting various age groups, ethnic or religious
minorities?
3. In your judgment, what positive changes in women’s status have come about,
especially over the last 10 years?
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4. Since the removal of gender quotas from national policies, have women found it
harder to gain access to political institutions?
5. When running for office, do women have a harder time gaining party nominations
compared to their male counterparts?

Part 3: Personal Experiences regarding women’s rights and participation in politics
1.

Did you or any women close to you hold political positions prior to
independence? If so, which ones?

2. How does your party approach “women’s issues?” Committees? Elections?
Mainstreaming?
3. Have any of your immediate family members been elected to political office? If
yes, which family member and position?
4. How does your political party approach ethnic issues?
5. Who gets nominated and how within your political party?
6. What elements (party support, money, family connections) are needed to be
considered a legitimate candidate for political office?
7. Does your own party have a form of quota? Do you support the idea of gender
quotas? Why? Why Not?
8. What committees are female politicians more likely to serve on?
9. What two or three factors contributed or hindered your desire to run for political
office?
10. What barriers do women face when expanding a female-based agenda?
11. What examples can you provide of how female representatives represent their
female electorate?
12. What policy arenas are more women needed?
13. What do you think are the main obstacles or incentives of forms of assistance that
make it easy/hard for women to be adequately represented within the legislature?
14. Based on your experience, what policy arenas have women found most success?
Least success? Examples?
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Part 4: Role of Outside Organizations
1. How often does your organization interact with government institutions? Do you
receive contributions? Expertise? Do you offer these for in-kind donations?
2. At what level do governmental institutions collaborate with NGOs on gender
policies?
3. What role should non-governmental organizations play when promoting women’s
access to political institutions?

Part 5: If you were in charge for a day
1. What are the 2 or 3 biggest stumbling blocks for women being able to
participation in the decision making process?
2. What are the 2 or 3 most important changes you would like to see? How likely are
these changes? Do you see differences among ethnicity or age groups?
3. Do you think that women’s presence in parliament really does make a difference?
How?
4. Have you personally promoted any policies that you think would increase the role
of women within governmental institutions and civil society?
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APPENDIX B
Highlighted Excerpts from Kazakhstan’s Constitution
Article 5

3. Formation and functioning of public associations pursuing the goals or actions
directed toward a violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the
integrity of the Republic, undermining the security of the state, inciting social,
racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity, as well as formation of
unauthorized paramilitary units shall be prohibited.
Article 7
1. The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the Kazak
language.

Article 13
I. Everyone shall have the right to be recognized as subject of the law and protect
his rights and freedoms with all means not contradicting the law including selfdefense.
2. Everyone shall have the right to judicial defense of his rights and freedoms.
3. Everyone shall have the right to qualified legal assistance. In cases stipulated
by law, legal assistance shall be provided free of charge.
Article 14
1. Everyone shall be equal before the law and court.
2. No one shall be subject to any discrimination for reasons of origin, social,
property status, occupation, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude towards
religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstances.
Article 20
2. Propaganda of or agitation for the forcible change of the constitutional system,
violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining of state security, and
advocating war, social, racial, national, religious, class and clannish
superiority as well as the cult of cruelty and violence shall not be allowed.

114

Article 32
Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to peacefully and
without arms assemble, hold meetings, rallies and demonstrations, street
processions and pickets. The use of this right may be restricted by law in the
interests of state security, public order, and protection of health, rights and
freedoms of other persons.

.
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